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Financial stability is a state in which the financial system, including key financial markets and financial institutions, is capable
of withstanding economic shocks and can fulfil its key functions smoothly, i.e. intermediating financial resources, managing
financial risks and processing payment transactions.
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s fundamental interest and joint responsibility with other government institutions is to maintain
and promote the stability of the domestic financial system. The role of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the maintenance of
financial stability is defined by the Central Bank Act and a Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, the Ministry of Finance and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank facilitates and strengthens financial stability using all the tools at its disposal and, should the need
arise, manages the impact of shocks. As part of this activity, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank undertakes a regular and comprehensive
analysis of the macroeconomic environment, the operation of the financial markets, domestic financial intermediaries and the
financial infrastructure, reviewing risks which pose a threat to financial stability and identifying the components and trends
which increase the vulnerability of the financial system. 
The primary objective of the Report on Financial Stability is to inform stakeholders on the topical issues related to financial
stability, and thereby raise the risk awareness of those concerned as well as maintain and strengthen confidence in the financial
system. Accordingly, it is the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s intention to ensure the availability of the information needed for financial
decisions, and thereby make a contribution to increasing the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Financial Stability, Financial Analysis, Monetary strategy and Economic
Analysis as well as the Payments and Securities Settlements Directorates, under the general direction of Péter TABÁK,
Director. The project was managed by Márton NAGY, Deputy Head of Financial Stability. The Report was approved for
publication by Júlia KIRÁLY, Deputy Governor. 
Primary contributors to this Report include Tamás BALÁS, Ádám BANAI, Attila CSAJBÓK, Gábor GYURA, Dániel
HOMOLYA, Márton NAGY, Judit PÁLES, Róbert SZEGEDI, Anikó SZOMBATI. Other contributors to the background
analyses in this Report include Gergely FÁBIÁN, Péter FÁYKISS, Gyöngyi KÖRMENDI, Gábor KONCZ, Zsolt OLÁH,
Gábor SZIGEL and Bálint TAMÁSI. 
The Report incorporates the Monetary Council’s valuable comments and suggestions following its meetings on 5 October and
2 November 2009. However, the Report reflects the views of the contributing organisational units and does not necessarily
reflect those of the Monetary Council or the MNB.
This Report is based on information in the period to 30 September 2009.
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Since publication of the last Report on Financial Stability in April 2009, central
banks and governments across the developed world have taken unprecedented
remedial actions – in terms of both methods and scale – to stabilise their
financial systems and economies. As conventional monetary policy tools
became increasingly constrained, central banks eased monetary conditions
further by deploying a range of unconventional measures, while governments
introduced fiscal stimulus packages. Anti-cyclical monetary and fiscal
interventions were aimed at cutting the negative feedback loop between the
financial sector and the real economy by restoring the smooth operation of
financial systems and fostering an economic recovery.
As a result of the various measures (mainly assuming part of the private sector’s
risk) by developed country central banks and governments, financial systems
and economies gradually returned to normal functioning. Liquidity conditions
in international financial markets improved and there were numerous signals
that recession in the developed economies was coming to an end. International
organisations expect growth to start again in the developed economies early
2010 at the latest.
Direct state involvement in developed economies will ultimately need to be
reduced over the longer term. If national authorities withdraw from markets
before their normal operations have been restored, however, another wave in
the confidence crisis may occur. By contrast, if the authorities wait too long,
the risks associated with the sustainability of high public sector debt and market
distortions could impede the recovery. The continued fragility of financial
systems and delays in reforming regulatory and supervisory regimes also make
the timing of an exit scenario very difficult. 
Despite improving global investors’ sentiment, there is still significant
uncertainty about the performance of the global financial system. First,
labour market adjustment follows the economic cycle with a lag, and
consequently the deterioration in banks’ loan portfolios may only peak in the
period ahead. This can be a problem particularly in the euro area, as the
European banking sector is currently registering losses which limit the
internal capital accumulation. Second, in preparation for the anticipated
deterioration in portfolio quality, banks may deleverage their balance sheets
further by cutting back lending in order to improve their own capital
adequacy, which may aggravate recessionary risks.
Since March 2009, CDS spreads in the Central and Eastern European region
have fallen substantially and exchange rates have appreciated. All of this has
made it possible for governments to restart their sovereign bond issuance
programmes. The Hungarian Government successfully issued five-year euro-
denominated foreign currency bonds. Implementation of the fiscal adjustment
package and the reduction in the government’s and banks’ refinancing risks
contributed significantly to the change in the S&P’s rating outlook from
negative to stable and to the improvement in investor sentiment towards
Hungary.
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Overall assessment
Developed country central banks 
and governments have significantly
eased monetary and fiscal conditions
Interventions by the national
authorities have led to a
considerable reduction in systemic
risk and improving economic growth
outlook
Reducing government and central
bank involvement in economic
stimulus is necessary, but normal
operation of financial systems and
economies has not yet been fully
restored
Deterioration in euro area banks’
loan portfolios is likely to be a
prolonged process, therefore, the
credit supply may remain weak
Domestic financial market conditions
have also improved significantly
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Due to the high degree of openness of the Hungarian economy, the
deterioration in global macroeconomic conditions has led to a rapid adjustment
by the private sector and a sharp contraction in economic activity. Owing to
the large net foreign debt, however, the adjustment in Hungary has been
sharper and larger than in countries in a more favourable external financing
position. The high indebtedness of the government and private sectors – the
most important sources of Hungary’s vulnerability – needs to be reduced. All
of this, in turn, results in a significant, albeit unavoidable output loss over the
short term, but improves the sustainability of long-term economic growth. As
a result, Hungary’s GDP is likely to decline sharply this year, followed by a
moderate economic contraction in 2010.
Confidence indicators describing the future developments of economic activity
have been rising continuously, and the euro area economy has performed
above expectations. In Germany and France, GDP growth in the second
quarter of 2009 was positive, which may improve the growth outlook for
Central and Eastern Europe countries, including Hungary. Despite this, there
are several downside risks to Hungarian growth prospects. Among the external
risk factors, the fragility of the euro area economy and financial system can be
highlighted. As concerns the domestic factors, the pro-cyclical behaviour of the
fiscal and monetary policy as well as the banking sector may cause persistently
weak demand.
The domestic banking sector has also been adjusting rapidly to the new
financial and macroeconomic environment, resulting in a contraction in
lending as well as a stronger deposit collection. This, in turn, has led to a
decrease in the loan-to-deposit ratio and a rapid decline in the domestic
banking sector’s reliance on foreign funding. As the adjustment on both the
asset and liability sides have mainly affected foreign currency loans and
deposits, the banking sector’s on-balance-sheet open FX position narrowed and
thus outstanding FX swap volumes and the need for FX swap market financing
declined. Banks’ assets side liquidity has also improved, in addition to a
reduction in funding risks. Currently there is ample HUF liquidity available for
the banking sector. Normalisation of financial market operations has also
contributed to the smooth adjustment of the banking sector. Bid-ask spreads
have narrowed significantly and – except in the spot foreign exchange market
– in the FX swap, the uncollateralised interbank and the government bond
markets have returned to the low levels seen before October 2008.
The banking sector is facing a significant deterioration in portfolio quality and
mounting loan losses in the recessionary environment of this year and the next.
In the first half of 2009, the partial passing on of the weak exchange rate and
high foreign funding costs to costumers resulted in deterioration in banks’
portfolio quality. However, looking ahead, it seems likely that the dominant
factor will be the unfavourable macroeconomic conditions. The rising
bankruptcy rate for the corporate sector, and an increasing unemployment rate
and falling real wages for the households’ sector, will reduce borrowers’ ability
to meet their debt service requirements in the corporate and household sectors,
respectively. In line with our previous projection, the banking sector’s loan
losses on corporate and households portfolios are expected to triple from the
end of 2008 to the end of 2009, reaching 3 per cent. In 2010, corporate loan
losses are projected to increase further, due to a pick-up in the corporate
Reduction in the country’s
vulnerability implies a sharp output
loss over the short term; however, it
improves the sustainability of 
long-term economic growth
The global economic outlook has
improved steadily, but a number of
downside risks remain for Hungarian
growth prospects
The banking sector has adjusted to
the new environment by rapidly
reducing its loan-to-deposit ratio
Due to the output loss associated
with the necessary adjustment of the
economy, the quality of loan
portfolios has deteriorated sharply
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
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bankruptcy rate, while household loan losses may decrease slightly, owing to a
slowdown in the increase in unemployment and banks’ workout activities.
Despite the substantial loan loss provisioning, the banking sector’s earnings
exceeded our expectations in the first half of 2009 and was only slightly less
than in the same period of last year. This is a remarkable development as the
euro area banking system recorded losses due to the write-down on toxic assets.
The profitability of Hungarian banks was attributed mainly to outstanding
revenues from financial transactions, rising interest income and improvements
in operational efficiency. This strong profitability is, however, unlikely to be
maintained in the future, given that, with the exception of efficiency
improvements, earnings were boosted by one-off factors. Banks will try to price
rising risk costs into the interest spread, i.e. the difference between lending rates
and the funding costs, but this is unlikely to absorb loan losses entirely. The
deteriorating income generating capacity of financial enterprises poses another
downside risk to the financial system performance. Financial enterprises may
incur losses even during this year, which may significantly reduce the
consolidated results of banking groups owning financial enterprises. 
The banking sector’s already large capital buffers increased further in the first
half of 2009. The capital adequacy ratio rose from 11.2 per cent to 12.3 per
cent and the Tier 1 capital ratio from 9.3 per cent to 10.3 per cent by June
2009. Two important factors in these developments were that banks realised
strong profits which were used for internal capital accumulation and that
parent banks injected capital to reinforce the capital position of their
subsidiaries. The sector’s current level of capital appears adequate along the
baseline macroeconomic path. The banking sector’s capital adequacy ratio is
expected to remain above 11 per cent over the period to the end of 2010, while
all systemically important banks’ capital adequacy ratios are likely to exceed
the 8 per cent minimum capital requirement.
According to the stress test results, in an unfavourable macroeconomic scenario
a significant part of the banking sector would need a capital injection.
However, the estimated amount of aggregate recapitalisation needs (HUF 100-
170 billion for the entire banking system) is manageable. Parent banks have
shown firm commitment to meet the future capital needs of their Hungarian
subsidiaries even under more difficult conditions. This is not only
demonstrated by their past behaviour, but also by their joint statements signed
in Brussels.
1
An additional guarantee is that the Government will continue to
make available a EUR 1 billion capital fund as part of its bank support package
until the end of 2010, which may provide sufficient buffer to cover banks’
capital needs even in a stress scenario.
Households increasingly borrowed in foreign currency in previous years, which
significantly exacerbated the vulnerability of the financial system and the
economy. The financial crisis made the risks of household FX borrowing and
excess indebtedness evident. Foreign investors’ declining willingness to take
risks led to both HUF depreciation and a sharp rise in country risk premia,
which, in turn, triggered an increase in banks’ foreign funding costs. Large,
sustained depreciation of exchange rate, coupled with the banks passing on
The banking system may reach
higher-than-expected profits this
year, but this is mainly due to one-off
factors
The banking sector’s current capital
position is strong and is expected to
remain so along the baseline
macroeconomic scenario
The recapitalisation needs emerging
in an unfavourable scenario are
manageable
Reducing risks associated with
households’ foreign currency lending
and excess indebtedness …
1 http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2009/052009.htm;  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1359&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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their higher funding costs to lending rates, led to a substantial increase in
instalments on households’ foreign currency loans. That, in turn, caused a
sharp surge in defaults, leading to deterioration in the banking sector’s financial
position. The Magyar Nemzeti Bank considers necessary to use regulatory
instruments, in order to limit risks. These include the tightening of risk taking
guidelines and lending criteria in order to strengthen responsible lending.
The financial crisis has shown that the supervisory authorities of financial
markets must adopt different policies than in the past, in respect of both crisis
prevention and crisis management. Hungary’s domestic authorities responsible
for financial stability have realised this and have formulated proposals for a
new supervisory architecture, in consultation with the IMF. In the proposed
framework, the HFSA would have a right to issue regulations, the
responsibilities of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the field of financial stability
would be broadened, the legal status and organisational framework of the
HFSA would be strengthened and a Financial Stability Council would be
established in order to harmonise prudential supervision at both systemic and
individual levels.
… as well as developing an efficient
regulatory and supervisory
framework are the key tasks for the
Hungarian authorities responsible
for financial stability
Direction of change
Risk of persistently low economic growth 
Liquidity risks facing the domestic financial system 
Solvency risks facing the domestic financial system 
Note:  increased significantly,  increased slightly,  remained flat,  fell slightly,  fell significantly.
Reassessment of risks identified in the April 2009 issue of the Report on Financial Stability
1  Financial market and macroeconomic risks

The international financial market environment and the
macroeconomic outlook have improved considerably since the
publication of the Report on Financial Stability in April 2009.
One of the key risks identified in the last report was that
economic recession and the financial system turbulence in
developed countries may exacerbate each other. Following the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the central banks and the
governments of developed countries took unprecedented
actions to prevent a negative feedback loop between the real
economy and financial sector and to ensure that the financial
systems do not hinder, but rather support economic recovery.
The positive effects of public interventions associating with
the take-over of the private sector risks have become
increasingly apparent since the beginning of 2009. The
liquidity conditions of financial markets have improved,
funding costs have decreased, and several indicators suggest
that the global economy has reached a turning point.
Notwithstanding the positive trends, the financial system and
the economy remain fragile, and the financial system is still
unable to support economic recovery on its own. 
One of the most important sources of fragility is the
unsustainability of prolonged public support. All market
participants are aware that the central banks and the
governments will have to scale back their roles over the long
term. Premature withdrawal by the state at a time when the
markets are not capable of functioning independently may
result in a resurgence of the confidence crisis. By contrast, if
the government leaves the markets too late, economic
recovery may be inhibited by sustainability risk of high public
debt and persistent market distortion. Withdrawal is also
difficult because strengthening of the banking sector and the
development of an adequate regulatory system are necessary
before this occurs.
The international financial system remains vulnerable. Since
the labour market follows the economic cycle with quite a lag,
the realisation of massive loan losses in the banking system
still lies ahead. This risk is particularly relevant in the euro
area due to the more pronounced labour market rigidity
coupled with low income-generating capacity of the banking
sector. The euro area banking sector has been unprofitable
since 2008 and, thus internal capital accumulation is limited.
Though the capital adequacy of the banking systems has been
progressively improving primarily as a result of public capital
injection, it is uncertain whether this capital buffer is
sufficient to absorb future loan losses. This uncertainty may
lead to further deleveraging and persistently tight credit
standards. 
The stabilisation of developed financial market operations and
the improvement of global investor sentiment combined with
Hungarian central bank and government measures all
contributed to stabilisation of the domestic financial markets:
CDS spreads decreased, a successful issuance of foreign
currency denominated government bonds took place, the
volume of HUF-denominated government securities’ auctions
returned to the pre-crisis levels, and key financial market
operation normalised. 
Due to Hungary’s high level of financial and economic
integration, the changes in developed economies have led to
adjustments in the private sector and subsequently to an
economic downturn in Hungary as well. Although the process
was triggered by external factors, it has been also significantly
intensified by internal factors. Due to high external
imbalances, the level of adjustment in Hungary is inevitably
faster and higher compared to that of other countries. This
adjustment decreases Hungary’s vulnerability by lowering the
external financing requirements, but at the same time
contributes to the deepening of the recession. As a result of the
considerable economic downturn, the income position of
companies has deteriorated significantly, driving up
bankruptcy rates. The labour market adjustment and
deleveraging of companies’ balance sheet lead to a decline in
real wages and employment, which worsens the income
position of households, while forcing a decline in the
indebtedness. 
The better-than-expected global economic developments
may improve the Hungarian economic outlook. For
Hungary, the beginning of 2010 is expected to be a turning
point, and the economy may recover from the recession as
early as the end of 2010. At the same time, uncertainties,
surrounding the performance of the financial systems in
developed countries – especially in the euro area countries –
represent a rather significant downward risk concerning
economic growth.
FINANCIAL MARKET AND MACROECONOMIC RISKS
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In an effort to stabilise the financial system and the
economy, the central banks and governments of
developed countries took significant actions. Using
traditional monetary instruments, the central banks of
developed markets quickly responded to the liquidity crisis
triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in October
2008. After the short term liquidity problems had been
resolved, however, deflation and recession concerns
appeared. As early as the beginning of 2009 the US Federal
Reserve (Fed) and the Bank of England (BoE) reduced their
policy rates to below 1 per cent, and the European Central
Bank (ECB) cut its policy rate to 1 per cent. Thus, the
possibility of further economic stimulation via traditional
monetary instruments became strongly limited.
Consequently, the use of non-traditional instruments
increasingly came to the forefront at the central banks in
developed countries.
2
This was also justified by the need to
handle the disturbances on the securitisation and
government securities markets. In addition to central bank
interventions, governments also assisted the financial system
via bank guarantees on the asset and liability sides and via
capital injections.
3
In the United Kingdom, the total amount
of the measures announced by the central bank and the
government as a percentage of GDP reached 90 per cent,
and amounted to around 70 per cent and 20 per cent in the
United States and the euro area, respectively (see Chart 
1-1). The low level of public interventions in the euro area
may suggest that bank support packages, including the
establishment of ‘bad banks’ is still in an early phase. Finally,
in addition to supporting the banking system directly
through fiscal instruments, developed country governments
also facilitated economic recovery by stimulating internal
demand. As a result, according to IMF’s October forecast,
the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP may reach 10 per cent
in the United Kingdom and the United States this year, while
the euro area may face a budget deficit of 5 per cent. 
The functioning of the money markets in developed
countries has gradually improved. As a result of central
banks’ liquidity provisioning in the form of direct loans and
FX swaps in the developed countries, short-term interbank
interest rates started to decrease from October 2008, and
consequently spreads between interbank rates and key policy
rates narrowed to the levels before the Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy (see Chart 1-2). In the euro market, recourse to
the ECB’s deposit facility decreased, while interbank market
turnover rebounded, which may also signal the easing of
short-term liquidity tensions and counterparty risks.
Following stabilisation of the interbank markets, in early
2009 the volume of short-term direct loans and foreign
currency swaps from central banks to the banking sector
gradually declined, although in the second quarter of 2009
the activity of the ECB and the BoE increased again. The ECB
introduced the 12-month direct loan, while BoE expanded its
asset purchase programme. At the same time, the balance
sheet of the Fed was stagnating, as the declining utilisation of
central bank loans was offset by a sudden surge in asset
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200914
1.1  Global financial markets and the economy
have stabilised, but complete regeneration may
take a long time
Chart 1-1
Announced size of central bank and government
financial support schemes as a percentage of GDP 
(June 2009)
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Central bank
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(asset support schemes)
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(bank+SPV*)]
Note: *SPV = special purpose vehicle.
Source: Bank of England Financial Stability Report.
2 We can differentiate two main types: credit easing and quantitative easing. In case of the former, the central bank purchases securitised loan products; in case of the
latter it purchases government securities.
3 For further details see: André Meier (2009): Panacea, Curse, or Nonevent? Unconventional Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom, IMF Working Paper 09/163.
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09163.pdf; Bank of England (2009): Financial Stability Report,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/index.htm.
purchases. These programmes were already aimed at
stabilising the long-term money and credit markets.
Long-term financing conditions have also improved. As
early as October 2008, the Fed began purchasing short-term
corporate bonds and from November 2008 it initiated a
programme to purchase the debt instruments and mortgage-
backed securities of government sponsored enterprises (GSE)
(see Chart 1-3). In addition, in March 2009 the programme
was expanded to cover the purchase of government bonds,
and the Fed significantly increased the total amount available
for the purchase of covered and uncovered securities of
government sponsored enterprises.
4
At the end of September
2009, the Fed announced that government bond purchases
were to be terminated by the end of October, while the asset
purchase programme for GSEs’ securities would be extended
until the end of the first quarter of 2010. Finally, the Fed also
announced that it would test the interbank market’s
operation by introducing reverse repo transactions to reduce
surplus liquidity. The BoE launched its asset purchase
programme in January 2009 with no liquidity effect initially,
as it was conducted through the Asset Purchase Facility
established for this purpose and financed by the government
via the issuance of treasury bills. The central bank purchased
commercial papers, corporate bonds and bank debt securities
issued under Credit Guarantee Scheme. Since March 2009,
however, the BoE has also been authorised to finance asset
purchases (especially government securities) via money
issuance. The ECB launched its own asset purchase
programme limited to high-quality mortgage bonds in early
FINANCIAL MARKET AND MACROECONOMIC RISKS
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Chart 1-2
Spread between 3-month LIBOR and OIS (overnight
indexed swap) interest rates
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4 The Fed announced a programme for the purchase of mortgage-backed securities of government sponsored enterprises with a volume of USD 1,250 billion, which
accounts for more than 20 per cent of the total outstanding amount. All other asset purchase programmes remain below 5 per cent of the outstanding amount.
Chart 1-3
Central bank assets as a percentage of GDP 
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July 2009. While the value of the ECB’s asset purchase
programme is rather small relative to its balance sheet, the
intervention can be considered fairly significant compared to
the size of the covered bond market.
5
The asset purchases
initiated by the central banks have contributed significantly
to reviving securitisation and increasing liquidity. The market
liquidity of long-term uncovered debt securities has also
improved. The number of bond issuances has gradually
increased. Even without government support, stronger banks
are capable of issuing an increasing number of debt securities.
Although weaker banks continue to rely on public support in
raising long-term funds, the issuance of government
guaranteed securities has declined. The reason is not only an
improving money market environment, but also the fact that
markets perceive government support as a negative sign.
Improved financing conditions are also clearly reflected by
the fact that, in several cases, funding costs have fallen below
the levels prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (see
Table 1-1). Although the scope and size of the central bank
and government measures have significantly dampened the
impact of a systemic crisis similar to the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers, money and credit markets are still unable
to function independently, and financial conditions continue
to be tight. The regeneration of key markets must continue in
order to enable the financial system to perform its
intermediary function efficiently once again.
The global economic outlook has improved as well.
Reinforcement of the financial system in the developed
countries and the substantial monetary and fiscal
stimulus have mitigated the depth of the economic
recession, and significantly improved the future outlook.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200916
Pre-crisis period Turbulence Crisis Consolidation Recent period
Jan. 2007– Aug. 2007– 15 Sep. 2008– Dec. 2008– Sep. 2009 
July 2007 14 Sep. 2008 Nov. 2008 Aug. 2009 average
average average average average
Inter-bank spreads ( 3-month LIBOR – OIS):
– USD 8 68 222 78 12
– GBP 10 70 195 111 27
– EUR 5 62 150 76 34
5-year CDS spreads of the banking sector:
– US 18 158 209 211 115
– UK 7 97 140 167 137
– Eurozone 9 79 146 197 114
– Average of the parent banks of the domestic 
banking sector 21 81 153 206 129
The 5-year average sovereign CDS spreads:
– US - 11 33 53 23
– UK - 13 52 100 50
– Eurozone 5 18 61 103 60
5-year CDS spreads of investment grade corporate 
sector:
– US (CDX) 37 105 198 176 107
– Europe (ITRAXX) 25 76 143 145 88
Sources: Thomson Datastream, Bloomberg.
Table 1-1
Spreads of main financial markets prior to the default of Lehman Brothers and at present 
(in basis points)
Chart 1-4
Quarterly GDP growth in the euro area and the
German IFO sentiment indicator
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Recovery has already started in Asia, which is considered to be
the main driving force of the global economy, and according to
international institutions, economic growth is expected to
rebound in other parts of the world during the second half of
2009 or at the beginning of 2010 at the latest. The fact that a
number of economic indicators have proved to be unexpectedly
positive in recent months is a particularly favourable
development. In the euro area, confidence indices suggest that
expectations have improved consistently since the beginning of
the year, while the economy performed above earlier
expectations (see Chart 1-4) in the second quarter. 
Due to the sustainability risk of public debt, government
intervention is expected to inevitably decline in
developed countries, which may impede economic
recovery. In the developed countries the fiscal economic
stimulus packages (provided in the form of direct financial
transfers, government lending and tax reductions
6
) may become
mid-term risk factors as a result of excessive budget burdens (see
Chart 1-5). Higher financing requirements and the related
increase in funding costs significantly boost the risks related to
the sustainability of public debt levels. Moreover, beyond a
certain point fiscal expansion may hinder, rather than support,
economic recovery. In most developed countries the interest
rate channel has reached its limit, while increasing public debt
combined with higher risk premia may lead to an increase in the
general interest rate level which, as opposed to the original
intentions, may crowd out private sector investment and reduce
household consumption.
7
Sustainability risks will inevitably
force developed countries’ governments to reduce their
interventions. However, it is uncertain how long it will take to
re-start the automatic mechanisms of the financial system and
the economy. If central banks and governments cut back their
support of the financial system’s operation and abandon
economic stimulation prematurely, the recession could deepen
once again. In this case a U-shape or a W-shape growth path
may occur as opposed to a rapidly rising V-shape path.
According to the U-shape path a persistent period of slow
growth is expected, while the W-shaped path forecasts another
recession before a recovery can start.
Growing unemployment and the still vulnerable
banking sector may slow down the central banks’ and
governments’ withdrawal from monetary and fiscal
stimulus. A number of factors suggest that the economy and
the financial system are still fraught with problems, which
means that a premature exit form government measures may
hinder economic recovery. The impact of the crisis on the
labour markets remained moderate until recently. There may
be a prolonged period of rising unemployment (see Chart 
1-6); therefore a recovery could be delayed or even impeded
by the deteriorating expectations and rising precautionary
savings of households. The significant depreciation of
households’ financial and housing assets may also lead to a
prolonged period of subdued internal consumption. Finally,
the deterioration of loan portfolio quality may be persistent,
which might jeopardise the stability of the financial system. 
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Chart 1-5
Gross public debt to GDP in developed countries
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Chart 1-6
GDP growth and unemployment in the USA and the
Eurozone
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7 See the summary paper in IMF: Companion Paper-The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/030609a.pdf.
The main reason behind the vulnerability of the
financial system is the uncertainty surrounding the
future magnitude of portfolio deterioration and its
impact on banks’ profitability. In 2008 the share of non-
performing loans in the portfolio of US banks quadrupled to
reach 4 per cent.
8
This massive portfolio deterioration was
primarily the consequence of a sharp fall in housing prices and
rising unemployment. Albeit to a lesser extent, the share of
non-performing loans in Europe also increased in 2008,
reaching 2.4 per cent compared to 2.1 per cent in the previous
year.
9
The more moderate increase is attributed to the
protracted effect of the crisis on the labour market and banks’
portfolio quality in Europe. Losses from portfolio
deterioration can be absorbed by banks’ before provisioning
earnings or as a last resort, by their capital. However, the
profitability of banks across the EU declined significantly in
2008, while in late 2008 and early 2009 the banking sector
reported a negative profit due to losses on structured products
and trading activities. It can be regarded as an unfavourable
development, as in the case of the core activity significant
portfolio deterioration is still to come. In addition,
provisioning, and hence a decline in income may accelerate
due to decreasing ratio of impairment provisions to non-
performing loans. By contrast, the capital adequacy of the
European banking sector shows some slight improvement as a
result of capital injections by the public authorities and the
market. Despite the losses, in 2008 the CAR (capital adequacy
ratio) increased to 11.7 per cent from 11.4 per cent, while the
Tier 1 CAR rose to 8.2 per cent from 8.1 per cent. Since
recapitalisation in the European banking sector exceeded
write-offs, the capital buffer is expected to have strengthened
further in the first half of 2009.
10
The absorption of losses
caused by the recessionary environment and withstanding
further shocks – i.e. a deeper, more protracted economic
downturn – are the biggest challenge to the banks’ capital
buffers, which might eventually result in further
recapitalisation and balance sheet downsizing.
Banks in developed countries are adjusting by
continuous deleveraging. Banks in developed countries are
steadily deleveraging their balance sheets as they adjust to the
new macroeconomic and financial market environment (see
Chart 1-8). This has been particularly true in the United States
and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser degree in the euro area.
At present, the leverage of the banking sector in all three of
these areas falls behind the level of early 2002. Strengthening of
banks’ capital adequacy is contributing to the deleveraging
process. On account of their massive, partly public capital
injections the United States and the United Kingdom stand out
in this process. Beside the waves of capital injections, however,
stagnating or narrowing balance sheet totals have also
contributed to the deleveraging process. Due to shrinking
central bank balance sheets, weakening lending activities and
the reduction in the excessive liquidity on the market, the
balance sheet totals of the banking sectors in all three of these
areas have declined consistently since the beginning of 2009. It
is also important to note that the declining issuance of
structured products and the dismantling of the shadow banking
sector may lead to a more subdued off-balance sheet activity as
well.
11
For the Hungarian banking system, the development of
banking activities in the Eurozone is the key factor. If Eurozone
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Chart 1-7
Portfolio quality and profitability of the EU banking
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Source: ECB EU banking sector stability report.
8 Source: Federal Institutions Examination Council.
9 Source: EU Banking Sector Stability, a publication of the ECB. http://www.ecb.int/pub/pub/prud/html/index.en.html.
10 According to the information of Bloomberg, in the first half of 2009 the write-offs reported by the banking sector of the EU amounted to around EUR 50 billion, while
banks were able to access to a total of EUR 70 billion fresh capital.
11 About the size of off-balance sheet items see: Report on Financial Stability (October 2008). http://www.mnb.hu/Engine.aspx?page=mnbhu_stabil&ContentID=11578.
banks reduce their activity more than justified by the weakening
credit demand this would have a negative impact on lending not
just in Hungary but through decreasing external parent bank
financing in the host market as well. This risk is further
exacerbated by the low income-generating capacity of parent
banks. Many Eurozone banks have been generating low profits
or losses on an unconsolidated basis (not taking into account the
earnings of subsidiaries and other entities) recently. As a result,
internal capital accumulation is strongly limited, and moreover
losses at many institutions are leading to deterioration in capital
adequacy, which can force the parent banks to accelerate their
deleveraging process and their repatriation of subsidiaries’
profits. 
As a consequence of the protracted adjustment in the
banking sector, tight non-pricing credit standards may
persist. In developed markets, changes in banks’ credit
standards may signal potential turning points in lending
activity, and thereby, in real economic activity.
12
As a result of
continuous deleveraging to improve capital adequacy and
banks’ low risk appetite, there have been no positive
developments in credit conditions to date (see Chart 1-9).
According to the senior loan office surveys of the Fed and the
ECB, increasing liquidity risks and the deteriorating
macroeconomic outlook have clearly led to tightening pricing
and non-pricing conditions in the previous year. Recent
surveys from the aforementioned central banks point to the
fact that the lending conditions remained tight in the first half
of 2009, however it was due to the uncertain economic
prospects, low risk tolerance and industry-specific problems
rather than liquidity risks. Although central bank
interventions have improved price conditions, persistently
tight credit standards suggest weak future lending activity.
This risk is being mitigated by a strengthening
disintermediation process in developed countries. Larger and
stronger firms are financing themselves via the capital market
primarily via bond issuance as this option is cheaper than bank
loans. This is clearly reflected by the fact that the CDS spreads
on investment grade firms are lower than those of banks and
have also dropped to pre-crisis level (see Table 1-1).
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of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 38(6) September, pages 1575-1597.
Chart 1-8
The leverage of developed countries’ banking
system 
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Chart 1-9
Credit standards (difference between the ratio of
banks indicating tightening vs. easing) and annual
credit growth in the United States and the euro area
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Investor sentiment in the region – including Hungary –
has improved significantly. Due to the improving global
investment climate and recovering risk appetite, CDS
spreads
13
of Central and Eastern European countries have
been narrowing continuously since March 2009 (see Chart 1-
10, Table 1-2). Despite this remarkable decrease, the level of
CDS spreads still exceeds the levels before the default of
Lehman Brothers. Narrowing CDS spreads have encouraged
the issuance of foreign currency denominated government
bonds in several countries in the region. Although the
amounts of the government bond series fell behind – while
their spreads significantly exceeded – the levels before
October 2008, the issues proved that the countries of the
region can again obtain funds from the market on their own.
In July 2009 Hungary successfully issued a EUR 1 billion bond
with a maturity of 5 years and a spread 425 basis points above
the comparable German government bond, which further
boosted confidence in Hungary. In addition, due to the
successful fiscal consolidation the rating agency S&P revised
the outlook on Hungary’s credit rating to stable from
negative. Furthermore, the strengthening of the financial
systems and economies in the region may also contribute to
boosting investor confidence. However, GDP figures in the
region have been rather unfavourable up to now, except for
Poland, which has a somewhat less open economy. The Baltic
States are in a deep recession; their banking sector is suffering
from drastically falling housing prices. Finally the high ratio of
foreign currency denominated loans poses a serious problem
in Hungary, Poland and the Baltic states making them
extremely vulnerable to an external risk premium shock. 
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1.2  Domestic money market environment is
improving and the country has become less
vulnerable, while economic agents face a deep
recession
Country Issuance Maturity Amount Coupon Bund margin 
(year) (euro bn) (%) (bp)
Poland 18 Jan. 2007 15 1.5 4.50 32.2
Hungary 1 Feb. 2007 10 1.0 4.38 28.3
Slovakia 15 May. 2007 10 1.0 4.38 12.5
Lithuania 29 Oct. 2007 10 0.6 4.85 68.3
Latvia 5 Mar. 2008 10 0.4 5.50 163.8
Hungary 11 June 2008 10 1.5 5.75 120.8
Czech Republic 11 June 2008 10 2.0 5.00 45.8
Romania 18 June 2008 10 0.8 6.50 188.6
Poland 20 June 2008 10 2.0 5.63 98.8
Lithuania 29 Jan. 2009 7 0.1 9.95 647.6
Poland 2 Feb. 2009 5 1.8 5.88 291.8
Czech Republic 5 May 2009 6 1.5 4.50 163.8
Slovakia 21 May 2009 6 2.0 4.38 141.5
Lithuania 22 June 2009 5 0.5 9.38 644.7
Hungary 28 July 2009 5 1.0 6.75 424.2
Sources: Thomson Datastream, MNB.
Table 1-2
Five-year CDS spreads and fixed-interest rate on Eurobond issues of CEE countries
13 For further details, see: Kornél Kisgergely: “What moved sovereign CDS spreads in the period of financial turbulence?” (Background study I.), November 2009, 
http://english.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=stabjel_1_kisgergely_200911_en. 
In Hungary, balance sheet adjustments in the private
and public sectors drastically reduce the country’s
main source of vulnerability, the external financing
requirement, but deepen the economic recession at the
same time. Due to Hungary’s high level of financial and
economic integration, the changes in developed economies
have led to adjustments in the private sector and an economic
downturn in Hungary as well. However, because of the
country’s large net external debt, the level of adjustment of
private and public sectors in Hungary is inevitably faster and
larger compared to other countries. At the same time this
rapid adjustment decreases Hungary’s vulnerability – i.e. it
lowers the external financing requirement – and contributes
to the deepening of the recession. In 2009, the ratio of
external financing requirement to GDP is expected to
decrease to 0.9 per cent compared to 7.6 per cent in the
previous year and then to improve further slightly in 2010
(see Chart 1-11). Moreover there are downside risks to the
country’s external financing requirement in the two years
ahead. Nonetheless, the situation appears to be less favourable
when one takes into account that Hungary’s debt ratio is still
high in international comparison, and only a gradual decline
can be expected over the long term.
14
Improvement in the
external balance cannot take place without a negative impact
on the economic performance. As a result of the global
economic recession and the deleveraging process in the
private and public sectors, the Hungarian economy has been
in recession since the middle of 2008. Following a decline of
around 7 per cent in 2009, the economic output may contract
only slightly in 2010 and may grow again in 2011. 
As a consequence of the severe economic downturn,
the income position of the private sector is
deteriorating, which is only partly offset by the
declining debt burden due to the strengthening HUF
exchange rate and moderating external financing
costs. The income position of the corporate sector has been
affected extremely adversely by the simultaneous decline in
external and internal demand. In particular, the construction,
manufacturing and service sector have been hit hard by the
slump in activity. In these sectors the ratio of bankrupted
companies increased drastically in the first half of the year,
with the bankruptcy rate exceeding 5 per cent (see Chart 
1-12). As for the domestic economy as a whole, the
bankruptcy rate is currently around 4.5 per cent, and may
peak by the end of 2010. Companies have adjusted wages
and employment to offset deteriorating profitability, but the
extent of these adjustments has fallen short of our
expectations so far. This may lead to a larger-than-expected
decline in corporate profitability and a steeper increase in the
bankruptcy rate, or may further accelerate wage and
employment adjustments. It remains to be seen whether the
smaller-than-expected adjustment by firms will eventually
lead to a deterioration of the household sector’s income
position during a potential acceleration of the corporate
sector or labour market adjustment. Reflecting companies’
wage adjustments, our current forecast indicates a slight
moderation in real household wages for 2009. However,
primarily as a result of a less drastic economic downturn and
the lowering of personal income tax, wages may start to
increase again in 2010. The unemployment rate may increase
at a decelerating pace until the second half of 2010,
approaching 11 per cent, while at the same time the
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Chart 1-10
Five-year CDS spreads and fixed-interest rate on
Eurobond issues of CEE countries
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Chart 1-11
The external financing requirement and GDP growth
in Hungary
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employment rate may drop below 49 per cent. The turning
point in labour market developments is not expected until
the last quarter of 2010. On the whole, these developments
will result in a significant deterioration in the income
position of households in 2009, and a somewhat more
moderate one in 2010. Changes in the exchange rate and
interest rates on foreign currency denominated loans are
crucial for the income position of the private sector due to
the high level of foreign currency indebtedness in the
corporate and household sectors. The HUF exchange rate has
been strengthening continuously since March 2009, while the
costs of external financing have moderated. However, the
positive effect of these two factors on loan rates may have
been dampened, particularly in the household segment, by
the high credit risk premia and high domestic financing costs
associated with fierce retail deposit competition.
15
Growth outlook of the Hungarian economy has
improved, but the risk of persistently low economic
growth is still high. Economic growth in the euro area,
which is Hungary’s main trading partner, represents the most
significant uncertainty factor. The fact that Germany and
France reported positive economic growth for the second
quarter of 2009 is a positive development, which may
improve the growth outlook of the CEE countries exporting
predominantly to the euro area, such as Hungary.
Nonetheless, there are still several downward risks to
Eurozone economic growth. Since the euro area has a rigid
labour market, in the recessionary economic environment the
necessary employment adjustment will be a prolonged
process. Moreover, as a result of the portfolio deterioration,
European banks may incur even more substantial losses
which, due to their sustained negative profitability, may
increase the vulnerability of the financial system.
Furthermore, the extent of central bank and government
market interventions, as well as the size of the economic
stimulus packages are considered low in international
comparison. In addition to external factors, a number of
internal factors increase the risk of persistently low economic
growth as well. For example, the uncertainty surrounding the
budget for 2010
16
and banks’ weak lending activity are such
key factors. The pro-cyclical behaviour of the budget and the
banks may contribute to continued weak internal demand.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200922
Chart 1-12
Relevant real economic and financial variables
affecting the private sector income in Hungary
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Chart 1-13
Uncertainty in the GDP forecast for Hungary
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15 For further details, see Chapter 2.1.
16 For further details see: Quarterly Report on Inflation (August 2009). http://www.mnb.hu/Engine.aspx?page=mnbhu_inflacio_hu&ContentID=12970.
The pro-cyclical behaviour of the budget is primarily
reflected in the contracting government transfers and the
restraining effect of the July value-added tax and excise duty
increase on consumption. These factors, combined with
rising unemployment and the financial wealth loss during the
recession, may increase the precautionary savings of
households. The pro-cyclical behaviour of the banking sector
manifests mainly in the persistently tight credit conditions.
17
All in all, due to the above mentioned factors the future
market perception of domestic growth is highly uncertain
(see Chart 1-13).
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2  Risks of financial institutions

In the Report on Financial Stability published in April 2009
three major threats were identified: the negative economic
consequences of financial system adjustment, the high liquidity
risk and the high solvency risk. The following factors were
highlighted in April as the most important components of
liquidity risk: the high loan-to-deposit ratio, the significant
reliance on external funding, the shortening maturity of the
foreign liabilities, the large stock of FX-swaps and disturbances
in the operation of key markets. Among the solvency indicators,
the increasing loan losses in the banking sector and stresses on
capital adequacy were emphasized. 
Since the publication of the April Report, market and liquidity
risks have declined substantially due to the stabilisation of the
developed money markets, and local central bank, government
and parent bank intervention. Currently the financial system has
ample HUF liquidity, and normalisation of foreign currency
swap markets allows an undisturbed flow between different
currencies. The macro-prudential analysis concentrates on the
adjustment of the banking sector and the extent of losses arising
from loan portfolio deterioration. 
As a result of private sector adjustment, the loan portfolio of the
financial system has been continuously shrinking. In response to
the recessionary environment companies and households have
been restraining their credit demand and banks have been
maintaining tight price and non-price credit conditions. The
improvement in the private sector’s net financing position is
reflected by the decreasing loan-to-deposit ratio of banks. As
Hungary was hit by the crisis at the same time as it faced a
significant external imbalance, the adjustment has been faster
and the decline in the loan-to-deposit ratio has been steeper than
the regional average. In addition, the adjustment of the banking
sector not only decreased reliance on external funds, but –
through restrained foreign currency lending and foreign currency
deposit placements of the private sector – also triggered a decline
in the volume of outstanding FX swaps; in other words, the
banks’ exposure to the FX swap market has moderated.
Owing to the deteriorating portfolio quality, banks face sharp
rises in loan losses. The most significant deterioration in
portfolio quality has been in corporate project loans and
unsecured household loans. Banks’ efficient workout activities
together with government interventions dampen the quality
deterioration of the mortgage loan portfolio and hence reduce
the related losses, or smooth out their impact. The loan
portfolio quality of other financial intermediaries has
deteriorated as well; in fact the extent of the deterioration has
significantly exceeded that of bank portfolios, due to the high
ratio of vehicle purchasing loan and car lease denominated in
foreign currency in their portfolio. Regarding the bank
portfolio, loan loss rates for corporate loans are expected to
continue to rise until the end of 2010, while in the case of
households a slow decline is expected from the beginning of
next year. The loan loss rate of the non-bank portfolio may
continue to increase until the end of 2010. 
Over the past half year the profitability of the banking sector
– i.e. the sector’s primary buffer for withstand shocks – has
remained favourable. Despite rising credit risk costs, in 2009
H1 the domestic banking sector generated almost the same
amount of profit as in the same period of 2008. However, as
one-off factors accounted for a large part of this unexpectedly
good performance, it will be increasingly difficult for banks to
offset the profit-reducing effect of credit losses in the future,
which will result in continuously decreasing profits. This trend
may be exacerbated by the fact that non-bank financial
institutions have already been reporting a steep fall in profits,
which are expected to turn negative at the end of this year.
Losses at bank-owned financial enterprises may also result in
a marked deterioration in the profit of banking groups. 
Capital adequacy – the other source of the banking sector’s
shock absorbing capacity – has been subject to positive
developments as well. In the first half of 2009 the capital
adequacy of the domestic banking sector improved significantly
and in international comparison, the level of the capital
adequacy ratio is high. A sufficient level of capital adequacy is
important from two aspects. On the one hand, a sufficient
amount of capital is required to absorb loan losses. On the other
hand, strong capital capacity is essential to support lending
activity and economic recovery in the post-crisis environment.
The current level is sufficient along the macroeconomic baseline
scenario, and the recessionary environment is not expected to
require further notable recapitalisation.
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Chart 2-1
Main risk indicators in December 2008 and June
2009
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Tight price conditions are not expected to ease, as
rising credit risk premia are offsetting the decline in
external financing costs. In November 2008, newly
announced interest rates increased significantly for all
banking products, which primarily reflected the rising
refinancing costs stemming from a drastic deterioration in
liquidity conditions (see Chart 2-2).
18, 19
The previously
dominant Swiss franc denominated loan products practically
disappeared from the market. On the one hand, banks
systematically priced out these products, while on the other
hand, in an effort to reduce credit risk significantly, they
imposed tight credit conditions. Essentially, only HUF- and
euro-based loan products remained in the market; however,
their interest rates are higher compared to Swiss franc-based
loan products. Despite the decline in banks’ foreign funding
costs, household lending rates stabilised at high levels after
November 2008. Due to the ECB’s interest rate cut and a
decrease in the sovereign CDS spread, from the spring of
2009 the cost of banks’ external foreign currency financing
started to moderate.
20
Nevertheless, household lending rates
have not been lowered since November 2008. This may have
two underlying reasons. On the one hand, in order to
improve their loan-to-deposit ratios banks applied high, in
most cases double-digit retail deposit interest rates
independently from the development of central bank policy
rate.
21
Parallel to these developments, credit risk and loan
provisioning increased significantly, which were
compensated by banks setting higher lending rates. A
different trend can be observed for corporate loans. Euro-
denominated products have been on a continuous decline
since October 2008. Meanwhile, interest rates on HUF-
denominated corporate loans fell following the interest rate
cuts of the central bank in August 2009. The future
development of interest rates will largely depend on how
competitive will be the HUF-denominated loans against euro-
denominated loans. Interest rates of household loans
denominated in HUF and euro remained unchanged in
August 2009 due to banks’ fierce deposit competition and
increased credit risk premia; thus the significant interest rate
differential between HUF- and euro-denominated products
remained unchanged until Augustus 2009. In September and
October 2009, however, several HUF-denominated
mortgage loans appeared on the market with interest rates
around 10 per cent. It is expected, accordingly, that the
difference between the interest rate of HUF- and euro-
denominated household loans will decline. In respect to
corporate loans, the interest rate differential increased until
August 2009, reflecting the faster decline of euro-
denominated lending rates relative to HUF rates. Similar to
household products in the case of corporate loans the interest
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largely contribute to weak lending activity
Chart 2-2
Banks’ main lending rates on new contracts
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18 In the case of euro-denominated household mortgage loans the market entry of several large banks contributed to the rising interest rates. 
19 Banks’ interest spreads indicate that the increased funding costs were only partly transferred to customers. For further details, see Chapter 2.5.
20 This effect mechanism may have been dampened by the fact that – as banks transferred only a part of their increased cost of funds to customers in 2008 Q4 – lending
rates could only partly follow the moderation of the cost of funds from March 2009 as well.
21 In August the promotional deposit interest rates of the largest banks remained 10-11 per cent, which implied a decrease by 50 basis points compared to July. At the
same time, the central bank base rate decreased by 150 basis points between the end of July and the end of August.
rate differential is expected to start declining in the future as
well. The major risk in the development of interest rates is
the uncertainty surrounding the expected loan losses. Banks
are unable to assess future credit risks precisely; therefore
they are inclined to incorporate a higher premium into
interest rates than the expected losses, which may hinder
economic recovery. 
Credit conditions for both corporate and household
loans continue to tighten, but at a slower pace. In line
with global trends, Hungarian banks’ willingness to lend
continued to decline in 2009, and lending conditions for
companies and households tightened further (see Chart 2-3).
The pace of tightening has slowed down considerably,
however, as less and less banks are willing to change the
already tight credit conditions even further. The responses
suggest that the series of tightening moves is mainly due to
the expected impact of the economic downturn and banks’
increasing risk aversion, rather than liquidity risks. The
deterioration of non-price conditions was manifested
primarily in the tightening of collateral requirements and the
reduction of maximum maturities for corporates, and in the
raising of minimum down payments [declining maximum
loan-to-value ratio (LTV)] and in the lowering of the PTI
limit (payment-to-income) for households. Due to the strong
interaction between the banking sector and the
macroeconomy, persistently tight credit market conditions
imply a significant risk to economic growth. One promising
development is that banks intend to gradually ease conditions
in all credit segments from the final quarter of 2009. 
Lending to the private sector has decelerated
considerably with no turning point in sight until the
end of 2010 or the beginning of 2011. The domestic loan
portfolio of enterprises has been declining since the end of
November 2008 (see Chart 2-4), with an extremely
significant fall of nearly HUF 140 billion in 2008 Q4.
Although the contraction has eased somewhat since then
(HUF 90-100 billion), it is still considered to be high.
22, 23
Short-term loans (typically used for financing working
capital) declined more severely than long-term borrowings
(typically used for financing investments). Looking at the size
of companies, compared to large corporations, the
borrowings of small and medium-sized enterprises decreased
more significantly. In terms of denomination, no clear trend
can be discerned, with both foreign currency loans and HUF
loans on the decline. In addition to domestic bank loans, non-
bank corporate lending has become subdued as well. It
should be noted that the increase in direct external financing
partly offset the decline in domestic loans. Nevertheless, this
probably improved the funding of large corporations, rather
than small and medium-sized enterprises. In this case,
however, the assessment is hindered by the fact that direct
external loans are supposedly related to declared but not-
settled dividend payments. The growth rate of households’
bank loans has also decelerated significantly. In the past
households’ bank loans had increased by a monthly amount
of HUF 100 billion on average, whereas from November
2008, the stock increased only slightly or remained largely
unchanged. The decline in foreign currency mortgage loans
alone accounted for the deceleration of bank lending. At the
same time, it should be noted that households’ non-bank
borrowings (vehicle purchase financing) declined to a larger
extent than bank loans which led to a contraction in overall
household debt in 2009 H1. In our view, a future rebound in
lending will lag behind economic recovery.
24
A notable
increase in the loan portfolios is only expected at the end of
2010 or at the beginning of 2011, after a recovery in external
demand, a pick-up in investment projects and a decline in
bankruptcy rates and unemployment. 
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Chart 2-3
Changes in credit conditions of non-financial
corporations and households
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Source: MNB.
22 It should be noted that reliance on bank loans may have increased significantly in this period due to the drying up of alternative financing channels (commercial
lending). As a result, the continuing decline of bank loans indicates a rather more severe financing problem. 
23 Corporate lending must be maintained by banks, which received state loans or participated in the 6-month FX-swap tender of the central bank. These instruments
have been unable to prevent the contraction in corporate lending, but they moderated the credit supply side constraints.
24 Laeven, Luc and Valencia, Fabian (2008): Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database, IMF Working Paper No. 08/224. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08224.pdf.
Household borrowing has shifted away from Swiss
franc denominated products to HUF- and euro-
denominated loans. The decline in the net borrowing of
households is accounted for by a significant downturn in
new, gross borrowings, rather than an increase in maturing
stocks or the prepayment of outstanding loan amounts. The
volume of new bank loans is currently less than one half of
the figure for 2008 (see Chart 2-5). Yen-denominated
products have disappeared from the market; and Swiss
franc loans are only offered by a few small banks. Banks’
offerings have shifted primarily to HUF- and euro-based
loans. In the case of HUF loans, overdrafts came into focus
in 2009 Q2, while in July we saw an increase in the amount
of subsidised housing loan disbursements. Although
customers had submitted their loan applications before the
tightening of the subsidised housing loan system,
disbursements did not take place until the third quarter.
The increase in new euro-denominated products was mainly
related to home equity loans. Due to the existing interest
rate differential euro-based loans are expected to gain more
ground as well. The surge in HUF lending may be
supported by a decline in risk premia and the ensuing
reduction of the central bank base rate.
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Chart 2-4
Changes in the outstanding amount of private
sector loans 
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Chart 2-5
Foreign currency composition of households’ new
bank loans
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As a result of Hungary’s declining vulnerability – i.e. the
sharp drop in the high external financing requirements
and the change in the savings’ structure – the banking
sector’s high loan-to-deposit ratio has decreased
drastically. In Hungary, the loan-to-deposit ratio is
essentially determined by the net financing position of the
private sector and the behaviour of banks.
25
Over the short
term, however, re-allocation between forms of savings also
affects the ratio. The structure of savings is influenced not
only by the households’ decision, but also the development of
public debt and the denomination structure of its financing.
The banking sector’s loan-to-deposit ratio is over 100 per cent
and in recent years it has increased significantly, suggesting
that the private sector’s debt through the banking sector has
grown and the banking sector financed this through external
funds. In 2008 Q4 and 2009 H1, however the private sector
started to deleverage its balance sheet and therefore achieved
a net saving financial position, which largely contributed to
reducing the loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking sector, in
other words, a reduction of funding risk (see Chart 2-6). The
loan-to-deposit ratio has been further improved as a result of
two additional factors. On the one hand, due to fierce retail
deposit competition, the banking sector withdrew a
substantial amount of funds from other forms of saving,
namely, from investment funds and cash savings. On the other
hand, in 2009 H1 the Hungarian government refinanced
maturing HUF-denominated government securities primarily
from the IMF’s foreign currency denominated loan. The
evolving HUF liquidity (money previously held by owners in
government bonds) streamed into the banking sector in the
form of deposits. The banking sector and its clients are
expected to proceed with their adjustment to the changed
financial market and macroeconomic environment. In the
macroeconomic baseline scenario the private sector remains in
a net saving position until 2011-2012, which should
contribute to a further reduction of the loan-to-deposit ratio.
In 2009 Q3, however, the financing conditions of the
government improved considerably, the amount of HUF-
denominated government securities auctions returned to pre-
crisis levels and non-deposit savings forms became attractive
again. According to this, liquidity inflows into deposits from
government securities and investment funds are expected to
decline, or there could be a backflow as well. As a result of
further adjustment in the private and banking sector, the
decline in the loan-to-deposit ratio is expected to continue,
but at a slower pace than previously, because of re-allocation
of the saving structure. 
The Hungarian banking sector’s adjustment in the
loan-to-deposit ratio is considered strong in regional
comparison. While the ratio of the balance sheet total to
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2.2  The banking sector is adjusting to the new
environment by reducing funding risk, while the
functioning of financial markets is returning to
normal
Chart 2-6
Net financing position of the private sector and the
loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking sector
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25 In the case of several domestic banks the owner expects the bank to reduce the loan-to-deposit ratio and increase domestic liabilities.
GDP is either stagnating or increasing
26
in the countries of
the region, the adjustment of the banking sectors following
the financial turmoil in October 2008 is better reflected by
the decline in the loan-to-deposit ratio. The adjustment is
stronger in those countries where the loan-to-deposit ratio
was higher (see Chart 2-7). The only exception is Latvia,
where – despite a significant downturn in lending – due to
a sharp fall in household deposits the ratio declined only
slightly. Restrained lending already reflects the adjustment
that is taking place in the region, even though in most
countries it is still the growth in deposits that primarily
accounts for the decline in the loan-to-deposit ratios since
November 2008. Along with the CEE region, a contraction
in the loan-to-deposit ratio can be observed in the euro area
as well, the extent of which did not deviate significantly
from the regional average in the period under review.
The banking sectors’ reliance on external funds has
decreased in the region, including Hungary. At the
onset of the financial crisis in the last quarter of 2008 foreign
parent banks increased the financing of their Hungarian
subsidiaries by nearly EUR 3 billion. Subsequently, however,
normalisation of the money market situation and the private
sector’s gradual adjustment reduced the external financing
requirement, and thus reliance on external funds declined. In
parallel with the contraction in the loan-to-deposit ratio, an
outflow of external funds commenced (see Chart 2-8).
Nevertheless, in the domestic banking sector the volume and
ratio of external funds to the balance sheet totals still exceed
the levels observed in September 2008. In terms of the
stability of external funds, two factors are worth examining:
the share of parent bank funds and short-term loans. The
share of parent bank funds within external funds continued
to increase this year and approached 60 per cent. At the same
time, while the maturity of external funds shortened after the
beginning of the crisis in October 2008, no consistent shifts
have been observed in the maturity structure since the
beginning of 2009. The share of external funds with a
maturity of up to one year is fluctuating around 43 per cent.
When the crisis intensified after October 2008 other
countries in the region also experienced an inflow and in the
post-crisis period an outflow of external funds, primarily
from parent bank. 
Thanks to the adjustment in foreign currency assets
and foreign currency liabilities, the banking sector’s
reliance on the FX swap market has declined as well.
Due to a surge in foreign currency lending in previous
periods, the domestic banking sector has a high exposure to
foreign currency swaps (see Chart 2-9). FX swaps have
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Chart 2-7
Changes in the loan-to-deposit ratios of CEE banking
sectors since end-November 2008 (onset of the
crisis) until June 2009 
(exchange rate adjusted changes)
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26 Since the beginning of the year, the balance sheet totals of the banking sectors in the euro area and the Central and East European region have either stagnated or
decreased. However, in line with previous trends, the ratio of the balance sheet total to GDP or the loan-to-GDP ratio continues to rise, as the magnitude of the
economic downturn surpasses the size of balance sheet total or loan contractions. As lending activity lags behind the economic cycle, these ratios may start to decline
only after the economic turning point. 
Chart 2-8
Volume of external funds and their ratio to balance
sheet totals in the CEE banking sectors
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shorter maturity than foreign currency loans, which makes
the banking sector extremely sensitive to developments in the
swap market. In October 2008 the drying up of the domestic
swap markets as a result of the global financial market
turbulence triggered liquidity disruptions in the banking
sector; the renewal risk of FX swaps grew (lack of FX swap
renewal may increase the open net foreign currency position
of the banking sector), and depreciation of the HUF
increased the margin requirement (associated with the
forward leg of the swap transaction). Thanks to the
improvement in global money market conditions and the
joint effort of the central bank, the government and parent
banks, the situation eventually normalised. However, it is
crucial to gradually reduce the banking sector’s exposure to
the FX swap market, in other words, to facilitate the closure
of banks’ on-balance-sheet position. The FX swap stock is
influenced by three main factors.
27
The composition effect
influences the FX swap portfolio if customers change the
denomination structure of loans and deposits while keeping
their exposure steady. The volume effect occurs if the
increase or decrease in foreign currency denominated assets
is higher or lower than the increase or decrease in foreign
currency denominated liabilities. The third factor is the
exchange rate effect. If the exchange rate depreciates, banks
have to deposit more foreign currency due to the margin call
requirement of the FX swap’s forward leg. Banks typically
obtain this additional FX liquidity through another FX swap,
which they carry out using their HUF liquidity. The domestic
banking sector’s FX swap portfolio has built up significantly
in recent years, which can be primarily attributed to the
volume effect, i.e. the surge in FX lending (1st period). The
growth rate of foreign currency liabilities fell significantly
behind that of foreign currency assets, including foreign
currency loans. By contrast, in March-September 2008 the
FX swap portfolio decreased considerably (2nd period). In
addition to the appreciation of the exchange rate, the decline
in the swap portfolio was due to the changing denomination
structure of client deposits: the share of HUF deposits
decreased while that of FX deposits increased. The swap
portfolio was subject to an opposite, even stronger effect, due
to the notable depreciation of the exchange rate in
September-October 2008 (3rd period). Anticipating an
exchange rate adjustment, firms converted their loans from
HUF to foreign currency denomination, while firms and
households converted their deposits from foreign currency to
HUF denomination. The foreign currency loan portfolio
started to shrink at the end of 2008, but the volume effect
pointing to the diminishing of the swap portfolio was
neutralised by the reverse exchange rate effect until March
2009 (4th period). In March 2009 the swap portfolio
commenced a sustained descent from its historical high (5th
period). At this point, the exchange rate and also the volume
effects put downward pressure on the portfolio. The decline
in foreign currency loans decreased, while FX-based deposit
placements increased even further. Both corporate and
household FX deposit holdings have increased substantially.
For companies this process can be attributed to the fact that
they over-hedged their export revenues in the forward
markets, thus the decline in exports following the onset of
the crisis left them in an open FX position. As their activity
subsided, they had to place their excess FX liquidity in bank
deposits in order to close their FX position. In the case of
households, FX deposit placements may have been a
response to the high volatility of the HUF exchange rate. The
systematic reduction of the FX swap market exposure may
moderate further with the adjustment of economic agents
and the continued decline of foreign currency loans. This will
greatly contribute to the reduction of the banking sector’s
vulnerability. 
In addition to funding, banks’ asset side liquidity has
also improved. The liquidity of the banking sector has
improved significantly, not only because of lower financing
risks, but also because of the better asset side liquidity
position. The HUF liquidity of the banking sector was
boosted by central bank measures (lower reserve
requirements, wider range of eligible collaterals, new credit
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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27 Mák, István and Páles, Judit: Az FX-swap piac szerepe a hazai pénzügyi rendszerben (The role of the FX swap market in the Hungarian financial system), MNB Bulletin,
May 2009. http://www.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=mak-pales.
Chart 2-9
FX swap stock of the domestic banking sector and
its average remaining maturity
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structures) and by refinancing of the maturing HUF-
denominated bonds of the government by IMF FX loan. By
the middle of 2009 banks’ overnight deposits and two-week
MNB bill holdings reached an amount of HUF 4,000 billion,
which represents nearly 40 per cent of the central bank’s
assets, and nearly 15 per cent of the domestic banking
sector’s balance sheet total. This excess HUF liquidity was
accumulated gradually, and contributed to easing the
liquidity tensions of financial institutions (see Chart 2-10).
Banks’ lending decisions are currently determined by risk
appetite and the profit outlook, rather than liquidity
considerations. In the past half year the unfavourable
macroeconomic and money market environment raised credit
risk significantly, while banks’ risk tolerance weakened
significantly. This is reflected in banks’ decision to maintain
tight price and non-price credit conditions, which means that
they are not circulating the ample liquidity to the real
sector.
29
The ample HUF liquidity cannot flow into the real
sector through lending activity unless credit conditions
improve. If the outlook for economic activity and the
sovereign risk premium are not expected to improve
significantly, increased government involvement, in
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 2-10
Balance sheet of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank as a
proportion of GDP
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Chart 2-11
Aggregated and bid-ask spread liquidity indices by
market segments28
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28 For further details on the methodology see: Varga Lóránt and Páles Judit: Trends in the liquidity of Hungarian financial markets – What does the MNB’s new aggregate
market liquidity index show? http://english.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=mnb_bull_2008_04_judit_pales_lorant_varga_en.
29 If banks were willing to lend by multiplying commercial bank money, the balance sheet total of the banking sector would increase, while the volume of central bank
money would remain unchanged.
particular state guarantee programmes (take-over of the
banking sector’s credit risk), will be necessary to ease price
and non-price credit condition. 
The normalisation of the key financial markets’
operation has also contributed to lowering the
banking sector’s liquidity risk. Four financial markets
are considered to be of key importance: the spot FX
market, the FX swap market, the interbank market and the
government bond market. Liquidity improved significantly
in all four markets in the past half year, which is reflected
mainly in the narrowing bid-ask spreads (see Chart 2-11).
With the exception of the spot HUF market, bid-ask
spreads in all other markets have returned to the low levels
observed before October 2008. The unfavourable price-
factors remaining in the spot FX market can be attributed
to the still high, albeit decreasing, volatility of the HUF
exchange rate. Trading on the FX swap market has
normalised. Not only the bid-ask spread, but also the spread
between the implied and interbank HUF yields has dropped
to a low level. Moreover, banks’ reliance on the central
bank’s swap instruments has decreased significantly. Banks
have not used central bank’s overnight swap tender since
the end of April 2009, and the volume of new three-month
and six-month swap deals has diminished as well. In
addition, the remaining maturity of FX swap has increased
(see Chart 2-9). Price conditions in the interbank market
have improved considerably as well; nevertheless, turnover
has remained subdued. The main reason behind this,
however, is not insufficient HUF liquidity or high
counterparty risk, but the excessive HUF liquidity and the
narrow interest rate corridor. Because of the narrow
interest rate corridor (now 100 basis points compared to
the pre-crisis level of 200 basis points) and the ample HUF
liquidity available to all banks, banks are not lending to
each other, and thus the volume-weighted average
interbank interest rate is permanently at the bottom of the
interest rate corridor. In the government bond market both
the price-based and volume-based liquidity indices have
improved. Thanks to recovering global investment
sentiment and increasing demand, primary issues and
secondary turnover have returned to pre-crisis levels.
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The loan loss rates (loan loss provisioning to total
loans) in the banking sector’s corporate and
household portfolios may triple and, in line with our
previous expectation, may increase to 3 per cent by the
end of 2009. The most reliable indicator in the assessment
of portfolio quality is loan loss provisioning, in other words,
expected loan losses.
30
The ratio of loan losses to total loans
expresses the proportion of loans expected not to be
recovered, thus this ratio is often compared with the level of
expected losses and referred to as risk cost. The loan loss rate
stood at 1 per cent for banks’ corporate and household loan
portfolios at the end of 2008 and increased to almost 2 per
cent by June 2009 (see Chart 2-12). In the case of household
foreign currency loans, deteriorating loan portfolio quality
and the associated expected losses can be attributed primarily
to the devaluation of the exchange rate, rising FX interest
rates and the negative income shock. For companies, in
addition to the above mentioned effects, weakening external
demand and consequently, rising bankruptcy rates played
important role in portfolio deterioration. Also contributing
to the increase of the loan loss rate, lending dynamics have
decelerated significantly: only a mild growth can be observed
in banks’ household loan portfolio, while the corporate loan
portfolio has contracted substantially. As further portfolio
deterioration is expected, which may be accompanied by a
continuing decline in the loan portfolio, in line with our
previous expectation, the loan loss rate may increase to 3 per
cent by the end of 2009. The impending portfolio
deterioration is mainly a consequence of economic recession.
In 2009 loan repayment ability has been impaired by
increasing bankruptcy rates for companies and by sharply
rising unemployment for households.
In 2010, due to sharply rising bankruptcy rates, non-financial
companies’ loan loss rate may continue to increase, while it
may decrease slightly for households, thanks to more
subdued growth in unemployment,
31
strengthening HUF
exchange rate, real wage raises, and improving efficiency in
banks’ workout activities.
32
Upside risks are significant for
households. The stronger-than-expected adjustment of
companies in the labour market may lead to more substantial
loan losses in the household sector. The most profound
portfolio quality deterioration is expected to affect corporate
project loans and unsecured household loans. In the case of
mortgage loans the devaluation of collaterals may present an
upside risk. However, this risk is mitigated due to the banks’
intensified workout activity and the moderate decrease in
housing prices. Following a slight increase in domestic
housing prices in recent years, prices declined by around
only
33
6 per cent
34
in 2009 H1. However, it makes the
situation less clear-cut that the housing price statistics noted
above essentially reflect aggregate trends and are mainly
related to transactions where a single property is being sold.
If the workout of several problematic clients reaches a phase
where the real estate collateral is foreclosed and sold at
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200936
2.3  Credit risk is the most significant threat
jeopardising the stability of the financial system
30 For further details, see: Tamás Balás: “Comparison of the indicators describing the loan portfolio quality of the banking sector” (Background study III.), November 2009,
http://english.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=stabjel_3_balas_200911_en. 
31 Changes in unemployment and the loan loss rate are interrelated. Since the growth of unemployment will slow down in 2010 (growth of the unemployment rate
declines), a slight decline in loan losses is consistent with this development along with lagged effect.
32 According to the IMF Global Financial Stability Report published in October, in the euro area the ratio of provision on loans to total loans in the case of companies may
reach 0.7 per cent in 2009, up from 0.3 per cent in 2008; followed by a slight decline in 2010. For households, this ratio may exceed 1 per cent in 2009, up from 0.5
per cent in 2008, and a moderate decline may follow in 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/index.htm.
33 Compared to Hungary, housing prices demonstrated significantly higher volatility in the countries in the region, particularly in the Baltic States, Bulgaria and
Romania. In these countries the annual increase in housing prices exceeded 20 per cent on average between 2001 and 2008. As the asset price bubble burst, housing
prices fell by more than 30 per cent in 2009.
34 For further details, see: Áron Horváth and Gyöngyi Körmendi: “Changes in domestic housing prices” (Background paper).
Chart 2-12
Loan loss rate (loan loss provisioning to total loans)
of the banking sector’s non-financial corporate and
household loan portfolio
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auction (a faster procedure relative to normal sales), the
forced and expeditious sale – which involves several
properties at a time – may take place at significantly
discounted prices. Based on current auction prices this may
reduce the value of collateral by an additional 30 per cent.
However, both the bank and the client have a vested interest
in avoiding any sale of the property, which is reflected in the
small number of homes put up for auction (around 200
auctions per month).
35
Due to households’ strong repayment
willingness, government guaranties and the efficient work-
out activity of banks, the ratio of non-performing mortgage
loans may remain low.
36
Restructuring of loans is a positive phenomenon as it
improves clients’ loan repayment ability, while at the
same time allowing banks to reduce the level of
provisions set aside to cover expected loan losses. In an
effort to avoid or to smooth losses, the banking sector is
engaged in restructuring the loan portfolios and intensifying
workout activity, mainly in the case of household loans.
37
This process is also supported by a new act and its
implementing decree, which allow banks to extend
government-guaranteed bridge loans to assist distressed
debtors with mortgage loans.
38
The restructuring of loans is a
positive phenomenon as it reduces clients’ monthly debt
service costs and therefore helps prevent default. At the same
time, by restructuring loans banks can improve their non-
performing portfolio on an accounting basis, whereby they
can reduce the size of provisions for expected losses. In
addition to re-structured loans, a more prudent provisioning
behaviour of banks is crucial particularly in the case of
corporate project loans, bullet loans (products where
payment of the principal is due at the end of the loan term)
and mortgage loan backed unit-linked products.
Compared to the banks’ loan portfolio financial
enterprises may face more substantial portfolio
deterioration. The decline in household real income and
employment results in a significant deterioration in
households’ loan repayment ability. Furthermore,
households’ willingness to repay is lower for unsecured
loans than for secured loans. Since financial enterprises
have specialised primarily in foreign currency vehicle
financing the economic recession has had a devastating
effect on the quality of their portfolio. By June 2009 the
loan loss rate for financial enterprises’ portfolio reached 2.6
per cent, up from 1.4 per cent at the end of 2008 (see Chart
2-13). Since the unfavourable economic environment may
have a protracted effect on loan portfolio quality, and the
loan portfolio of financial enterprises is expected to
contract further, by the end of 2009 we anticipate a loan
loss rate of 4 per cent.
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Chart 2-13
Loan loss rate (total loss provisioning to total loans)
of the financial enterprises’ portfolio
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35 For further details, see: Dániel Homolya and Gábor Szigel: “Banks’ household credit collection procedures” (Background study IV.), November 2009, 
http://english.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=stabjel_4_homolya_szigel_200911_en.
36 In most cases, by restructuring the loans banks do not reduce the overall debt burden on the client. Banks merely lengthen the non-performing loan’s maturity period
and lower  the monthly instalment in an effort to improve the client’s debt repayment ability and thereby to avoid, postpone or smooth loan losses.
37 For further details, see: Dániel Homolya and Gábor Szigel: “Banks’ household credit collection procedures” (Background study IV.), November 2009, 
http://english.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=stabjel_4_homolya_szigel_200911_en.
38 Act IV of 2009 on government guarantee on non-performing home purchase mortgage loans.
The only reason behind the increase in interest income
– the most important source of profitability – is the
HUF exchange rate effect. Interest income recorded in
2009 H1 was 6 per cent higher than in 2008 H1. Interest
income grows in two basic cases: first, when banks raise their
interest margins (i.e. the increase in loan rates exceeds the
increase in funding costs); second, when the assets of the
banking sector increase. Growth in assets calculated on a
HUF basis reflects increased activity or depreciation of the
HUF exchange rate. If a bank has a substantial amount of
foreign currency assets and the domestic currency
depreciates, its nominal interest income can grow even if
interest margin and activity remain unchanged.
39
The interest
margin has declined to 2.8 per cent from 3.3 per cent
observed at the end of June 2008 (see Chart 2-14). The most
significant decline took place between October 2008 and
March 2009, when banks only partly transferred to
borrowers the sharply rising external and internal funding
costs (which is particularly true for the seven leading banks).
Following March 2009 external funding costs started to
decline, but competition for household deposits remained
fierce which, albeit to a lesser extent, narrowed the interest
margin even further. With an unchanged exchange rate, the
corporate loan portfolio was smaller in 2009 H1 than in
2008 H1. In year-on-year terms, the household loan
portfolio slightly exceeded the value observed in 2008. Thus,
the significant increase in assets resulted from the fact that
the HUF exchange rate was weaker by nearly 15 per cent
against the euro, and by nearly 20 per cent against the Swiss
franc in 2009 H1 compared with 2008 H1.
Despite significant increases in loan loss provisioning,
the profit realised by the banking sector in 2009 H1
was substantially higher than expected. By June 2009,
provisions set aside by the banking sector amounted to HUF
188 billion, which exceeds the total value for 2008 by one-
third, and is nearly 6.5 times higher than the value recorded
for 2008 H1 (the difference amounting to HUF 158 billion).
Provisions for impairment of the household and corporate
portfolio account for around two-thirds of this additional
provisioning. Thus far banks have been able to offset this
substantial increase in losses by excess earning realised from
other sources; consequently, in 2009 H1 the bank sector
achieved a profit of HUF 190 billion similar to 2008 H1 data
(see Chart 2-15). In year-on-year terms pre-provision profit
significantly exceeded – by 70 per cent – the last year’s value.
The most important factor boosting profits was the high
revenue from financial transactions, which doubled in size
compared to 2008 H1 and was nearly as high as the 2008
data. As opposed to the losses reported in the previous year,
the banking system realised continuously growing net gains
on securities (mainly on government securities). As described
above, as a second contributing factor the increase in net
interest income also contributed to offsetting loan losses. The
third contributing factor was improved efficiency through the
reduction of operating costs at several banks. This is a
particularly positive development, which will improve the
profitability of the banking sector over the longer term.
Finally, as a fourth factor, dividend income also increased at
a number of banks. Based on the developments of the first
half of the year, the banking sector is expected to post a
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200938
2.4  The banking sector is capable of absorbing
mounting loan losses, due to its strong
profitability and capital position
39 To explain it differently, if the exchange rate devaluates ceteris paribus, the monthly instalment amounts of FX loans will increase, and therefore the bank will realise
higher HUF-denominated income from interest payments. In the case of principal repayments this correlation does not apply, because banks reflect any exchange
rate risk deriving from the different denomination of assets and liabilities off the balance sheet.
Chart 2-14
Interest margins of the banking system and the
seven largest banks
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Source: MNB.
substantial amount of profit at the end of 2009. On the other
hand, since earnings have been boosted by one-off factors –
except cost efficiency improvement – this outstanding
profitability is probably not sustainable. Banks are striving to
incorporate their increasing risk costs – at least in part – in
the interest margin. However, the increased interest margins
will probably be unable to absorb loan losses, which may lead
to a gradual decline in profit. On the whole, the banking
sector’s pre-tax profit may exceed our projection of HUF
100-200 billion published in the April 2009 Report on
Financial Stability for 2009, and significantly fall short of the
projection of HUF 150-250 billion for 2010. It should be
emphasised once again, that reinvesting the profits in 2009-
2010 is one of the most important sources of strengthening
the capital position.
The number of unprofitable banks, however, is on the
rise. The banking sector’s annual rolling average of return
on assets (ROA) was 0.9 per cent in 2009 H1, while return
on equity (ROE) reached 12.7 per cent (based on profit
after tax, ROA and ROE stood at 0.8 per cent and 10.9 per
cent, respectively). This represents a slight decline
compared to the end of 2008. The profitability of the
Hungarian banking sector is considered favourable in
international comparison (see Chart 2-16). Profit
performance has exceeded expectations, which significantly
enhances the banking sector’s shock-absorbing capacity. At
the same time it should be noted that this profit has been
generated by a few large banks. While the ratio of
unprofitable banks was negligible in 2008 based on total
assets, by June 2009 the ratio had increased to 15 per cent
(see Chart 2-17). 
Although the profitability of financial enterprises is
still positive, they are expected to face losses in future,
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Chart 2-15
Pre-tax and pre-provision profit of the banking
sector
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Chart 2-16
Profitability indices of the Hungarian banking sector
in international comparison 
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Chart 2-17
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which may significantly worsen the consolidated
results of the affected banking groups. In 2009 H1, loan
loss provisioning increased considerably for financial
enterprises as well. At the sector level, this amounted to HUF
50 billion, which is three times as high in the same period of
2008; moreover, it exceeds the provisions for the entire year
of 2008 by 15 per cent. In addition, profitability was
weakened by the fact that the profit on financial transactions
fell far short of previous levels. Profit-reducing factors were
partly offset by the interest income, which continued to grow
at a similar pace as in previous periods, but the weaker
exchange rate also played an important role in this
achievement. As a result, the profit of financial enterprises
shrank to HUF 11 billion in H1, which represents one-third
of the value recorded in 2008 H1 (see Chart 2-18).
Meanwhile, pre-provisioning profit increased only slightly.
After a significant increase in the number of unprofitable
firms during 2009 H1, the ratio reached 40 per cent based on
total assets. As a result of a further rise in credit risk costs, i.e.
loan loss rate and a substantial contraction in the loan
portfolio, the sector’s profit may turn negative by the end of
the year, deteriorating banks’ domestic group-level
consolidated results.
The already considerable surplus capital of the
banking sector has continued to grow; its capital
position is adequate in the baseline macroeconomic
scenario. By June 2009 the capital adequacy ratio of the
banking sector has increased to 12.3 per cent from 11.2 per
cent, while the Tier 1 CAR rose to 10.3 per cent from 9.3
per cent. This capital adequacy is considered high in
international comparison (see Chart 2-19). The expansion
observed in H1 is attributed to several factors. Due to the
high foreign currency content of the assets, appreciation of
the exchange rate reduces the HUF-denominated value of
risk-weighted assets. In order to achieve internal capital
accumulation, a number of banks had their profit for H1
audited. In addition, parent banks increased their own
subsidiaries’ capital in numerous cases. In H1 2009, parent
banks’ capital injections reached HUF 50 billion (EUR 200
million). Finally, banks have also reduced their risk exposure
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Chart 2-19
Capital adequacy ratio of the Hungarian banking
sector in international comparison
(2008)
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by restraining lending activity, in particular in the corporate
segment.
40
Looking at the dispersion of the capital adequacy
ratio, the improvement was a general phenomenon (see
Chart 2-20). Nearly all banks have a CAR ratio of over 9 per
cent, and the number of banks in the highest category also
increased substantially. Looking ahead, the capital adequacy
ratio of the banking sector is likely to remain above 11 per
cent until the end of 2010, and none of the largest,
systematically important banks’ capital adequacy ratio will
probably drop below 8 per cent.
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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Chart 2-20
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40 In line with the owners’ requirement, several banks maintain or reduce the level of RWA (risk-weighted assets). However, in addition to restrained activity the structure
of RWA plays an important role in meeting this requirement. On average, the risk weight of corporate loans is higher than that of household loans, thus restraining
lending activity in view of this structure reduces risk exposure faster.
In the unfavourable scenario investigated in the stress
testing a deeper-than-expected recession and
depreciating domestic currency is postulated.
41
Our
stress testing exercise considers two macroeconomic
scenarios. The baseline scenario, i.e. the most probable macro
path in the 2009-2010 period, is identical with the one
published in the MNB’s Quarterly Report on Inflation
(August 2009). In the stress scenario, we attempted to outline
a “severe but plausible” scenario. In the stress scenario, the
global economy is hit by a new confidence shock, resulting in
a global fall in investment and consumption (W-shaped
recovery). Above and beyond the direct impact on domestic
consumption and investment, in an open economy such as
Hungary this decline would have a significant negative effect
on growth through the fall in external (mainly euro area)
demand as well. As a result of all the above, compared to the
baseline scenario, in the stress scenario growth is lower by a
total of 5 per cent during the two years. We also assumed that
in the stress scenario the considerable deterioration in growth
prospects trigger a risk premium shock, which results in a
nearly 16 per cent depreciation of the exchange rate
compared with the assumption in the baseline scenario, to
EUR/HUF 315 in the final quarter of 2009 (Table 2-1). With
regard to monetary policy, we assumed that it would remain
neutral due to the joint occurrence of negative shock on
economic growth and the risk premium shock. Through the
stress testing we analyse whether banks’ capital and pre-
provisioning income can cover loan losses with a capital level
remaining above the regulatory minimum, i.e. with a capital
adequacy ratio over 8 per cent.
42
In the stress scenario loan losses could be 5-6 times higher
than the previous years’ losses. Based on empirical
relationships between historical loan losses on banks’
household and corporate loan portfolio and the main
indicators of the macroeconomic environment (economic
growth, unemployment, inflation, exchange rate, domestic
and foreign interest rates) we forecasted the loan losses in the
baseline and stress scenario. There will be considerable loan
losses in the banking system, as loan losses increase to a level
around 3 times higher in 2009 and 4 times higher in 2010 in
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2.5  Credit risk stress test indicates manageable
recapitalisation needs in the stress scenario
Baseline Stress Difference between stress and
baseline scenarios
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
GDP* –6.7 –0.9 –7.9 –4.7 –1.2 –3.8
Private sector employment* –3.6 –1.7 –3.7 –3.1 –0.1 –1.4
Consumer price index* 4.5 4.1 4.7 4.7 0.2 0.6
HUF/EUR 281 272 292 315 3.9% 15.8%
Note: Values marked with an * show year-on-year percentage changes.
Source: MNB.
Table 2-1
Macroeconomic indicators in the two scenarios 
41 Our calculations have not taken into account market and liquidity risks as well as the effect of possible contagions through banks’ exposures to one another. The
analysis covers the whole Hungarian banking sector and considers the risk of both the financial corporations and foreign subsidiaries owned by the banks.
42 We took the capital increases implemented through September 2009 into consideration for the calculation of initial capital adequacy.
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the baseline scenario compared to the 1 per cent level typical
in previous years (see Chart 2-21). In the stress scenario, loan
losses could be even higher; at the end of 2010 loan losses
could be 5-6 times higher than in the past few years. It is
important to highlight that in both the baseline scenario and
the stress scenario loan losses reach their peak only in 2010.
This finding is in line with the experience that loan losses
tend to follow the business cycle only with some lag.
In the stress scenario the banking system’s earnings
before provisioning could decrease significantly in
2010. One of the sources of absorbing loan losses is banks’
earnings before provisioning. We forecasted the banking
sector’s earnings before provisioning for 2009 and 2010 in
both scenarios. According to our results, compared to the
2007–2008 average, earnings before provisioning increase
slightly in 2009, before declining markedly in 2010 (by 10
and 15 per cent in the baseline and stress scenarios,
respectively). According to the latest data the profits of the
banking sector in 2009 are expected to be higher than
previously anticipated. Taking this into account we also
prepared an alternative version for the bank income forecast,
projecting the decline assumed for 2010 using the average for
2007–2009, instead of the average for 2007–2008 (applying
an expert estimate for banks’ income in the remaining
months of 2009). 
In the stress scenario, a sizeable part of the banking
sector needs additional capital, but volume of
recapitalisation needs (HUF 100-170 billion) appears
to be manageable. Combining our assumptions for loan
losses and bank income results in net profit/loss, which
together with the initial capital level yield capital adequacy in
the individual scenarios. It is important to note that no
dividend payments were taken into account, i.e. we assumed
that banks will use their 2009 and 2010 profits, if any,
entirely to strengthen their capital positions.
43
We use the two
forecasts for profits before provisioning to give a lower and
upper boundary estimation for capital needs. In the baseline
scenario, the capital adequacy ratio of the banking system
could remain around 11.9–12.8 per cent by end-2010. While
capital adequacy remains on a more or less stable path at the
aggregate level, individual banks show strong heterogeneity,
although the capital adequacy ratio of all the major,
systemically important banks remains above 8 per cent. In the
stress scenario, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio declines
to 8.2–9.1 per cent by end-2010. But while capital adequacy
is satisfactory at the aggregate level, there is significant
asymmetry in this case as well. Namely, in the stress scenario,
the capital adequacy of 40 per cent (or 57 per cent weighted
by the balance sheet total) of the banking sector would not be
satisfactory, which may also affect certain systemically
important banks. In order to reach the legal minimum for
capital adequacy, however, under-capitalised banks would
need only a moderate amount of capital injections, totalling
HUF 100-170 billion. Risks may be reduced by the
commitment of domestic banks’ parent banks to provide for
the capital adequacy of their Hungarian subsidiaries, which
has been demonstrated so far (in the form of significant
capital increases during the year) and also confirmed in
statements on 20 May 2009
44
and 25 September 2009.
45
Another risk mitigation factor is that state of Hungary
extended the availability of the scheme for the EUR 1 billion
capital fund that would be sufficient to cover the banking
system’s capital need even in the stress scenario. 
The calculations described above involve a high degree
of uncertainty. Our calculations have not taken into
account market and liquidity risks as well as the effect of
possible contagions through banks’ exposures to one another.
When exploring the correlations between various
macroeconomic variables and loan losses – as our time series
do not contain an economic downturn similar in magnitude
to the current one – we managed to take account of non-
linearities only to a very limited extent, which may lead to an
underestimation of risks especially in the case of extreme
shifts. In the case of foreign subsidiaries of Hungarian banks
we have a much less detailed picture of the correlations
between the macroeconomic environment and loan losses.
Banks’ income generating capacity shows much uncertainty,
as it is difficult to judge at this juncture, whether or not the
relatively good performance of banks in 2009 until now is
due to temporary effects, and whether or not it reflects a
long-term adjustment of the banking sector.
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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43 For the calculation of capital adequacy we also need the risk-weighted assets. Here we assumed that they change in proportion to outstanding loans.
44 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09180.htm.
45 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1359&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

3  Risk-reducing measures

The financial crisis posed several challenges for the
Hungarian authorities responsible for financial stability,
including the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. In response to these
challenges and with a view to strengthening financial
stability, the central bank took actions in two main areas.
The MNB drew public attention to the increased risks
associated with foreign currency lending on several
occasions, including its Reports on Financial Stability. As the
financial crisis has significantly raised the dangers of foreign
currency lending, the MNB urges the authorities to adopt, as
soon as possible, regulations designed to reduce such risks
materially and strengthen responsible lending. Such
regulations may involve tightening the risk policies and
lending conditions of the individual banks, including
restrictions on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the payment-
to-income (PTI) ratio, the currency denomination and the
maximum term of vehicle financing. At the same time, in a
joint effort with other institutions responsible for
safeguarding financial stability, the MNB has actively
participated in the elaboration of a new supervisory
structure. According to the government proposal, in the new
structure the HFSA would be empowered to adopt
regulations on certain issues; the scope of the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank’s responsibilities regarding financial stability
would be expanded; the legal status and organisational
structure of the HFSA would be modified; and a Financial
Stability Council would be set up with a mandate to
coordinate system-level and individual-level supervision.
RISK-REDUCING MEASURES
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Over recent years the rapid rise in household
indebtedness contributed significantly to the
vulnerability of the Hungarian financial system. Since
2000 a surge has been observed in household lending (see
Chart 3-1). The growing role of household financial
intermediation was partly a fundamental process, providing
an opportunity to optimise consumption-saving decisions for
a growing range of households for a longer period of time. At
the same time, it can be assumed that the rise in household
indebtedness was faster than justified by the convergence or
equilibrium process. The domestic consumption rate – which
is high in international comparison – and the sustained high
current account deficit in recent years also point in this
direction. At the individual level, the greatest danger
associated with foreign currency lending lies in the excessive
risk-taking of individuals. At the system level three major
risks may arise: the excessive indebtedness of households
(capital mismatch); the exchange rate risk associated with
foreign currency loans (currency mismatch); and the
difference between the asset-liability maturities of the
banking sector (maturity mismatch).
46
The excessive
indebtedness of households may lead to external imbalance
and an unsustainable growth path, further increasing the
vulnerability of the country. A marked exchange rate
depreciation increases the instalment amounts of foreign
currency loans, restricting households’ disposable income
and declining consumption as well as undermining the
repayment probability of household loans. The maturity
mismatch
47
characterising the banking sector generates
significant liquidity and financing risks. As a result of the
financial crisis, risks deriving from household foreign
currency lending have materialised. Declining risk appetite
led to a weakening of the HUF exchange rate and a
significant increase in sovereign risk premia simultaneously,
which also increased banks’ financing costs. Through a
substantial, sustained devaluation and the incorporation of
banks’ higher funding costs into the lending rates, the rising
instalment amount payable by households with foreign
currency loans and the income shocks at households
generated a substantial increase in defaults, which in turn
deteriorated the financial position of the banking sector. In
addition, liquidity risks were significantly heightened by the
shrinking of external financing opportunities and the drying
up of the FX swap market. All these factors contributed to
limiting the monetary policy’s room to manoeuvre in the past
period. 
Aiming to reduce risks associated with foreign
currency lending and indebtedness and to strengthen
responsible lending, the MNB has proposed regulatory
interventions in the area of household lending. In the
view of to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the use of regulatory
measures is required in this respect. The regulation aims at
tightening the risk policies of individual banks as well as
credit conditions for household loan products by prescribing
individually tailored conditions for HUF-, euro- and other
foreign currency-based loans based on the different risks they
imply. This could involve the definition of limits regarding
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the payment-to-income (PTI)
ratio and the maximum term of vehicle financing. In defining
the maximum level of LTV, real estate market price
fluctuations and risks deriving from depressed prices
associated with fire sales should be taken into consideration
in particular. Accordingly, a market price-based LTV limit of
70 per cent is recommendable for household HUF-
denominated loans.
48
In the case of the PTI ratio, the limit on
payment capacity can be estimated from the verifiable net
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3.1  Regulatory proposal by the MNB to
strengthen responsible lending
Chart 3-1
Household debt and household consumption rate
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46 It is important to stress that imbalances may build up at the macro level even though risks do not increase at the micro level.
47 Renewal risks are aggravated by the fact that long-term FX mortgage loans are financed through short-term external funds or short-term FX swaps.
48 The market price-based 70 per cent LTV limit is approximately equivalent to an 80-85 per cent collateral-based LTV limit.
income of the household and the statistical minimum amount
required for the sustenance of the household. For HUF-
denominated loans, the MNB has proposed PTI limits of 30
per cent up to the net average income recorded by the
household (net HUF 250,000 in 2008), 40 per cent up to
HUF 500,000, and 50 per cent for net average incomes
higher than that. Based on exchange rate volatility, the limit
for euro-denominated products should be 30 per cent tighter
for both LTV and PTI; and for loans denominated in foreign
currencies other than euro further tightening of a similar
magnitude is justified (Table 3-1 summarises the MNB’s
proposal). An LTV limit of about 70 per cent exists in a
number of countries including Austria, Romania, Bulgaria
and Ireland. Application of PTI limits can be found in fewer
countries. In addition to the Netherlands, there are
supervisory loan-to-income (LTI) limits or PTI limits in
Greece and in Romania.
Application of these limits proposed for HUF and
foreign currency loans by the MNB would prevent
excessive easing of credit conditions and excessive
household’s indebtedness thus contribute to more
sustainable economic growth and lower external
vulnerability on long run. As the growth rate of the
foreign currency loan portfolio decelerated significantly by
the beginning of 2009, while the share of HUF loans
increased, adoption of the limits at the present time would
not have a serious impact on the flow of credit and the
performance of the banking sector and the macroeconomy.
Nevertheless, as past experiences have shown, risks are prone
to rebuild quickly and therefore the proposed regulation
should be adopted even before the period of recovery. To
demonstrate the effect of the limits, we present below the
alternative macroeconomic path which the country would
have followed in the past if the limits had been introduced
earlier. For the purposes of this simulation we assumed that
clients exceeding the limit would have borrowed a smaller
loan amount consistent with the limit. In this case, if the
limits had been introduced in January 2004, net lending
during the five years between 2004 and 2008 would have
been lower by around HUF 1,200 billion.
49
This implies that
the household loan portfolio, which amounted to HUF 9,500
billion at the end of 2008, would have been around HUF
8,300 billion. A tightening of credit conditions on this order
of magnitude would not have generated similar constraints
on consumption and investment spending. The reason for
this is the fact that many households may have responded by
downsizing their financial assets, rather than restraining their
consumption and investment activity significantly, which
means that mainly lower-income households would have
demonstrated a more pronounced real economic adjustment.
The proposed regulations would have generated more
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Loan type Currency MNB’s proposal
Up to HUF 250,000 Up to HUF 500,000 From HUF 500,000
monthly net income* monthly net income* monthly net income*
For all types of household loans HUF 30 per cent 40 per cent 50 per cent
maximum payment-to-income ratio EUR 23 per cent 31 per cent 38 per cent
Other currency 15 per cent 20 per cent 25 per cent
For household mortgages HUF 70 per cent
maximum loan-to-value ratio EUR 54 per cent
Other currency 35 per cent
For car purchase financing HUF 80 per cent
maximum loan-to-value ratio EUR 62 per cent
Other currency 40 per cent
Maximum maturity of car financing: 5 years
Notes: Publicly announced on 5 October. 
* The income limit is to be applied to the entire household (incomes are added together in the case of more wage-earners).
http://english.mnb.hu/engine.aspx?page=mnben_pressreleases_2009&ContentID=13188.
Source: MNB.
Table 3-1
Summary of the MNB’s proposal
49 Upon estimating the impact of supervisory LTV limits on lending, we should not use the data from 2007–2008 as the starting point. Indeed, loans were extended
under excessively lax conditions in that period, and thus we need to take into account a period when there were tighter lending conditions, thereby allowing us to
observe a full cycle.
substantial restraint in (net) credit expansion in the last two
years mainly, thus the real economic effects would have been
the strongest in this period. According to our estimates, the
loss in new disbursements would have reduced the
consumption and investment demand of households by
around 20-55 per cent of the initial amount. Overall, in the
past five years lower lending activity would have decreased
GDP dynamics by 0.3 percentage points on average (see
Chart 3-2). At the same time – depending on the applied
model – the results of our estimates are dispersed in a wide
range (between 0.1 and 0.5 annually). It is worth noting that
at the time being, our macro-econometric models, used for
forecasting, could not capture entirely the simultaneous
feedback loops between the banking sector and the real
economy, which eventually could lead to larger estimation
errors. In addition to the quantification of growth effects it
should be stressed that regulation affecting household
lending would have impacted only the actual growth rate of
the economy, and would have had practically no effect on
long-term potential growth. The short-term output loss
would have been offset by a more favourable long-term
growth structure and lower external vulnerability i.e. lower
net external debt, which may have also reduced the extent of
the negative real economic adjustment observed this year.
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Chart 3-2
Effect of tighter credit conditions on GDP growth
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Reinforcement of the macroprudential analytical and
intervention framework is a key task. As crisis
experiences have confirmed, even if the participants appear
healthy and stable individually, certain risks may materialise
at the level of the financial system, which increase the
vulnerability of the overall system. Macroprudential
analysis should address two main dimensions of systemic
risks. First of all, it should examine the distribution of risks
between the sectors, and identify the type and magnitude of
risks that affect the main parts of the intermediary system at
that point. On the other hand, it is equally important to
examine the time dimension; in other words, to assess how
systemic risks evolve over time, and how the behaviour of
the participants of the intermediary system may escalate
these risks. Although it will take a long time to fully recover
from the current crisis, the foundations for a system that
will be capable of preventing the next, equally deep crisis
should be laid down now, during the period of
regeneration.
Changes in attitude, as well as structural and
organisational changes are required in the European
Union. In its proposals regarding the structural
transformation of the European Union’s financial
supervision, the expert group chaired by Jacques de Larosière
pointed out that too much attention was being paid to the
examination of individual institutions in the EU as well. The
new two-prong (macro- and microprudential) European
supervision system (see Chart 3-3) proposed by the report
will be set up as early as 2010. On the one hand, the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will be established, in
which central banks will play a key role. The main task of this
organisation will be to explore the systemic risks threatening
the financial stability of the EU. However, the ESRB will not
have tools for direct intervention to circumvent the identified
systemic risks on its own. Instead, it will draw attention to
threats and will put forward specific proposals as required to
the ECOFIN Council, the Member States or supervisory
authorities. While these proposals will not be legally binding,
the ‘addressees’ will be required to provide an explanation if
they fail to implement the proposed actions (‘act or explain’
mechanism). As regards microprudential supervision, the
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) will be
established with a mandate to provide a framework for closer
cooperation between national supervisors. 
The existing European supervisory committees – whose role
is currently limited to consultation – will become authorities
50
(European Supervisory Authorities, ESA), and will be
primarily responsible for the standardisation of national
regulations and supervisory practices, and cooperation and
information flow between national supervisors. The
supervision of financial markets and individual institutions
will basically remain a national responsibility. Therefore, the
ESFS – as a kind of decentralised network – will be composed
of Member State supervisors (set up in colleges of supervisors
‘around’ cross-border financial groups) and the three
European authorities. 
In line with the European changes, the draft
legislation
51
on the reform of domestic supervision
strengthens the coordination between micro- and
macroprudential supervision, and supplies both the
HFSA and the MNB with more efficient tools. In response
to frictions experienced in the handling of the financial crisis,
the cumbersome nature of the supervisory decision-making
mechanism and the insufficiency of the supervisory tool-set,
the government decided to revise the supervisory framework.
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3.2  Proposal to set up a new financial
supervisory structure
Chart 3-3
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Source: European Commission.
50 The three future authorities are comprised of the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
51 In view of the fact that the Parliament has not passed the legislation as of the date of the Report, we will limit its description to the expected changes, of which we
will only highlight the modifications most relevant to the topic discussed.
Having considered a number of possible alternatives, the
government puts forward a draft legislation to Parliament,
which is aimed at providing both the HFSA and the MNB
with more efficient tools, while at the same time
strengthening the coordination between micro- and
macroprudential supervisions. The HFSA will be reinforced
and made more efficient by becoming more independent of
the government, and by assuming the status of an
autonomous administrative body (rather than being a
government office) ‘reporting’ directly to Parliament. The
governing body of the Supervisory Board will be replaced by
personal governance (by the chairman), which is expected to
produce better response times. As another important change,
the HFSA will be empowered to issue legally binding
regulations, which will reinforce its influence on the prudent
operation of market participants on the one hand, and may
allow for more flexible regulatory responses to emerging
risks on the other hand. The other prong of the legislation
makes provisions regarding the roles of the HFSA, the MNB
and the Ministry of Finance in financial supervision and
regulation. This partly implies new directions, and partly
intends to clarify existing roles. Within the new framework
the HFSA will continue to focus on the stability and prudent
operation of individual institutions, and will strive to identify
and restrain the actions and risks threatening specific sectors.
The central bank assumes the main responsibility for
identifying risks jeopardising the stability of the financial
system as a whole. Closer cooperation between the two
authorities will be institutionalised and formalised.
Accordingly, the MNB will be represented in the Financial
Stability Council (FSC),
52
a new organisation set up for the
strategic control of the HFSA, which will allow the MNB to
impose its macroprudential aspects on the activity of the
HFSA more forcefully, including the identification of target
areas for supervision, or the contents of guidelines issued by
the HFSA. The 6-member organisation will have two
representatives from the HFSA, the MNB and the Ministry of
Finance, respectively. 
In order to prevent the rapid build-up of systemic
risks, the legislation also vests the MNB with new
competences, and formalises the role of the central
bank in the identification and analysis of systemic
risks. The MNB would receive additional authority in two
areas. If the macroprudential analyses indicated an
accelerated build-up of risks, the MNB would have authority
to intervene directly, i.e. to restrict, ban or impose conditions
on certain activities or products for a pre-defined period of
time (maximum 120 days). Moreover, the MNB’s
competences regarding the initiation of legislation will be
enhanced as well. According to the draft legislation, if – in
the interest of preserving financial stability – the central bank
proposes legislation to the government or the HFSA, they
will have to provide a detailed explanation in the case of
rejection, as is the case with the recommendations of the
European Systemic Risk Board described above. 
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52 Essentially, the FSC would be set up as an enhanced version of the Financial Stability Committee established in 2005 with the participation of the MNB, the Ministry
of Finance and the HFSA. The former organisation did not have decision-making authority and had a consultation role only; moreover, its activity was based on a
cooperation agreement between the three authorities rather than on national legislation.
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1  Risk appetite
Chart 1
Primary risk indicators
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
J
a
n
. 
0
5
F
e
b
. 
0
5
A
p
r
. 
0
5
J
u
n
e
 0
5
A
u
g
. 
0
5
O
c
t.
 0
5
J
a
n
. 
0
6
M
a
r
. 
0
6
J
u
n
e
 0
6
A
u
g
. 
0
6
O
c
t.
 0
6
D
e
c
. 
0
6
F
e
b
. 
0
7
M
a
r
. 
0
7
M
a
y
 0
7
J
u
ly
 0
7
S
e
p
. 
0
7
N
o
v
. 
0
7
D
e
c
. 
0
7
F
e
b
. 
0
8
A
p
r
. 
0
8
M
a
y
 0
8
J
u
ly
 0
8
A
u
g
. 
0
8
O
c
t.
 0
8
D
e
c
. 
0
8
J
a
n
. 
0
9
M
a
r
. 
0
9
M
a
y
 0
9
J
u
ly
 0
9
S
e
p
. 
0
9
Basis point
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
Basis point
JPM EMBI Global JPM Maggie High Yield
JPM Maggie A 
Source: Datastream, JP Morgan.
Chart 3
Dresdner Kleinwort indicator
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Chart 2
Implied volatility of the primary markets
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2  External balance and vulnerability
Chart 4
Net financing capacity of the main sectors and
external equilibrium as percentage of GDP
(seasonally adjusted)
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Chart 5
External financing requirement and its financing as
percentage of GDP
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3  Macroeconomic performance
Chart 8
GDP growth and its main components 
(annual growth rate)
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Chart 9
Employment rate and net wage developments
(annual growth rate)
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Chart 10
Use of household income as a ratio of disposable
income
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
9
5
 Q
1
9
5
 Q
3
9
6
 Q
1
9
6
 Q
3
9
7
 Q
1
9
7
 Q
3
9
8
 Q
1
9
8
 Q
3
9
9
 Q
1
9
9
 Q
3
0
0
 Q
1
0
0
 Q
3
0
1
 Q
1
0
1
 Q
3
0
2
 Q
1
0
2
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
3
0
9
 Q
1
Per cent
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Per cent
Consumption Investment
(right-hand scale)
Net financial savings
(right-hand scale)
Chart 11
Corporate real unit labour cost in the private sector
(annual growth rate)
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Chart 6
Net external debt as percentage of GDP
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Chart 7
Open FX position of the main sectors as percentage
of GDP
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Chart 12
Sectoral bankruptcy rates
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4  Monetary and financial conditions
Chart 13
Long-term default risk and forward premium of
Hungary
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Chart 14
Three-month EUR, USD, CHF and HUF money market
interest rates (LIBOR and BUBOR fixing)
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Chart 15
HUF/EUR, HUF/USD and HUF/CHF exchange rates
compared to January 3, 2005
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Chart 16
Volatility of the HUF/EUR exchange rate
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Chart 17
Interest rate premium of new loans to non-financial
enterprises 
(over 3-month BUBOR and EURIBOR, respectively, 3-month moving
average)
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Chart 19
Interest rate premium of new EUR loans to
households 
(over 3-month EUR LIBOR)
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Chart 18
Interest rate premium of new HUF loans to
households 
(over 3-month BUBOR)
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Chart 20
Real home prices
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Chart 21
Annualised yields on government securities’ indices
and money markets
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Chart 22
Annual yield of key Hungarian and Central and
Eastern European stock market indices
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6  Risks of the financial intermediary system
Chart 23
Indebtedness of non-financial enterprises as a
percentage of GDP
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Chart 24
Denomination structure of domestic bank loans of
non-financial enterprises
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Chart 25
Annual growth rate of loans provided to 
non-financial corporations by domestic banks
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Chart 26
Net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of 
non-financial enterprises
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Chart 27
Quality of the corporate loan portfolio
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Chart 28
Provisioning on loans of non-financial corporations
by industry
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Chart 29
Indebtedness of households in international
comparison
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Chart 30
Debt service burden of the household sector 
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Chart 31
Annual growth rate of total household loans
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Chart 32
Net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of
households by main products and currencies,
adjusted for exchange rate changes, seasonally
adjusted
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Chart 33
Household loans distribution by denomination
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Chart 34
Household loans distribution by collateral
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Chart 35
Distribution of new housing loans by LTV
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Chart 36
Quality of the household loan portfolio
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
2
0
3
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
4
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
2
0
4
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
4
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
2
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
2
Per cent
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Per cent
Loan overdue more than 90 days to total household loans
Cost of provisioning to total household loans
(right-hand scale)
Source: MNB.
Chart 37
Comparison of instalment payments of CHF- and
HUF-denominated housing loans
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Chart 38
Provisioning on household loans
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,400
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
9
0
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
2
Housing loan–
 HUF
Housing loan–
FX
Home equity Personal
and hire
pruchase
loan
Current
account
and credit
card loan
Vechicle
loan
HUF Bn
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Per cent
Outstanding amount Provision to outstanding amount
(right-hand scale)
Source: MNB.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • UPDATE • NOVEMBER 200962
Chart 39
Open FX position of the domestic banking system
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Chart 40
Banking sector’s exchange rate exposure
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Chart 41
90-day re-pricing gap of the banking sector
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Chart 42
Estimated maximum loss based on interest rate risk
stress tests relative to equity
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Chart 43
Liquidity index 
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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Chart 44
Liquidity sub-indices 
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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Chart 45
Bid-ask spread indices of the major domestic
financial markets 
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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Chart 46
Credit to deposit ratio of the banking sector 
(adjusted for exchange rate changes)
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Chart 47
Liquidity ratios of the banking sector
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Chart 48
External funds of the banking sector
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Chart 49
“One month” liquidity stress indicator of the
banking sector
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Chart 50
ROA, ROE and real ROE of the banking sector
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Chart 51
Dispersion of banks’ total assets by ROE
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Chart 52
Banking sector spread and its components
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Chart 53
Operating efficiency indicators of the banking sector
2.0
2.3
2.6
2.9
3.2
3.5
0
3
 Q
4
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
2
0
4
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
4
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
2
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
2
Per cent
43
46
49
52
55
58
Per cent
Cost/average total asset (left-hand scale)
Cost/income (right-hand scale)
Source: MNB.
Chart 54
Banks’ capital adequacy ratios
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Chart 55
Dispersion of banks’ minimum capital requirement
by capital adequacy ratio
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Chart 56
Liquidity needed for settling IBC-turnover as a
percentage of available liquidity and uncovered
transactions as a percentage of the turnover
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Chart 57
Monthly turnover/liquidity ratio (VIBER) and
monthly turnover and queue statistics
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Chart 58
Availability of domestic overseen systems 
(IBC, KELER, VIBER)
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7  Risks of the payment systems
The chart date (e.g. 2008) means the end of the year (the 31st
of December) if it’s not indicated otherwise.
Chart 1:
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk
appetite or increasing risk aversion.
Chart 2:
VIX: implied volatility of S&P 500.
MOVE: implied volatility of US Treasuries (Merrill Lynch).
Chart 3:
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk
appetite or increasing risk aversion.
Chart 4:
* General government: according to SNA methodology.
** Corporate sector and “error”: the financing requirement of
corporate sector is calculated as a residual, so it includes errors.
*** External financing requirement: adjusted by the difference
caused by imports brought forward on account of EU accession
and by the import increasing impact generated by customs
warehouses terminated due to EU accession and Gripen
acquisitions.
Chart 10: 
Disposable income is estimated by MNB using the
consumption, investment and financial savings data of
households.
Chart 12: 
Number of bankruptcy proceedings of legal entities, summed
according to the date of publication, cumulated for 4
quarters, divided by the number of legal entities operating a
year before.
Chart 13: 
The 5-year forward HUF risk premium as of 5 years from now,
compared to the euro forward yield (3-day moving average)
and the 5-year Hungarian credit default swap spread.
Chart 16: 
Historic volatility: weighted historic volatility of the exchange
rate (GARCH method).
Implied volatility: implied volatility of quoted 30-day ATM FX
options. 
Chart 20: 
Based on offer home prices in Budapest.
Chart 25: 
FX loans, exchange rate as of end-December 2000, HUF loans
adjusted by state loan refinancing in December 2002.
Chart 26: 
FX loans on December 2000, end of month exchange rate.
Chart 39: 
An increase in the swap stock stands for swaps with a long
HUF spot leg. Based on the daily FX reports of credit
institutions. Calculated from swap transactions between credit
institutions and non-resident investors. The MNB does not
take responsibility for the accuracy of the data. Revisions due
reporting errors and non-standard transactions can lead to
significant subsequent modifications of the data series. The
data series does not include swap transactions between
branches, specialised credit institutions, cooperative credit
institutions and non-resident investors. The swap stock is the
sum of termin legs calculated at actual foreign exchange rates.
Chart 42: 
The interest rate risk stress test indicates the projected result of
an extreme interest rate event; in this scenario this event is a
parallel upward shift of the yield curve by 500 basis points for
the HUF, and by 200 basis points for the euro, the US dollar,
and the Swiss franc. For the calculations we applied re-pricing
data and the Macaulay duration derived from them.
Chart 43: 
A rise in the liquidity index indicates an improvement in the
liquidity of the financial markets.
Chart 44: 
Similarly to the liquidity index, increase in liquidity sub-indices
suggests an improvement in the given dimension of liquidity.
Chart 45: 
A rise in the indices represents narrowing bid-ask spread, thus
an increase in the tightness and liquidity of the market. The
liquidity index of HUF FX-swap market includes the data of
USD/HUF and EUR/HUF segments, taking into account of
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Notes to the appendix
tom-next, overnight and spot-next transactions. The earlier
version of the liquidity index included only the tom-next
USD/HUF transactions.
Chart 46: 
Client loans include loans and bonds of non-financial
institutions, household loans, loans and bonds of financial and
investment enterprises, government loans, municipal loans and
municipal bonds. Client deposits include the deposits of non-
financial institutions, household deposits, deposits of money
market funds, deposits of financial and investment enterprises,
government deposits and municipal deposits. The loan-to
deposit ratio is exchange-rate-adjusted with respect to the last
period.
Chart 47: 
Funding gap is the difference between the exchange rate
adjusted customer credit and deposit, divided by the exchange
rate adjusted customer credit.
Chart 49: 
Stress scenario: we assume a bank-specific liquidity shock that
may originate, for example, from a crisis of confidence. Main
assumptions:
• Banks are unable to renew their liabilities from sources other
than deposits which are scheduled to expire within one
month (primarily interbank liabilities). 
• Customers withdraw the part of credit lines due within one
month, or redeem the part of guarantees due within one
month.
• Banks can obtain additional funds by using their liquid assets
with only a “haircut” varying for each asset.
• Customers fail to repay their overdrafts. 
The 1-month liquidity stress ratio shows the maximum
possible customer deposit withdrawal within one month that
could be covered by banks’ liquidity buffers, under the
assumption that they can not obtain new funds from external
sources (e.g. interbank market).
Chart 50: 
ROE: pre-tax profit / average (equity – balance sheet profit).
ROA: pre-tax profit / average total assets.
Interim data are annualised.
Pre-tax profit: previous 12 months.
Average total assets: mean of previous 12 months.
Average (equity – balance sheet profit/ loss): 12 month moving
average.
Deflator: previous year same month=100 CPI (%).
Chart 51: 
Pre-tax profit.
Chart 52: 
Interim data are annualised!
Interest income: previous 12 months
Interest expenditure: previous 12 months
Average interest bearing assets: mean of previous 12 months
Average interest bearing liabilities: mean of previous 12
months
Chart 53: 
Cost: previous 12 months
Income: previous 12 months
Average total asset: mean of previous 12 months
Chart 54: 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) = (total own funds for solvency
purposes/minimum capital requirement)*8%
Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio = (tier 1 capital after
deductions/minimum capital requirement)*8%
Chart 57:
Start-of-day balance adjustments and central bank payments
are excluded. 
Chart 58:
Due to differences in the nature of the overseen systems and in
the calculation methodology, comparing the availability ratios
can be misleading. The calculation methodology for the
availability ratio for KELER was changed in January 2008. The
ratios based on the new and old methodologies are not
comparable, which is why we will publish the data based on the
new methods for KELER in separate time-series.
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